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Abstract 
 
The main focus of this thesis lies in re-examining the impact of territoriality on the conduct 
of international relations in the context of separatism of exclaves. The enclaves were selected 
because of their specific territorial character, being separated from their mother state by a 
territory of another state entity. Our initial hypothesis stating that the demands of 
independence are formed by coexistence of both territorial and historical factor has been 
demonstrated on the cases of Cabinda and Oecussi. Using the qualitative comparative 
analysis, we have justified the selection of variables and conducted a cross-case study that 
confirmed our hypothesis. According to our findings, the historical background has a more 
important role in the creation of separatist tendencies than territory, while this has only a 
modifying effect on the initial preconditions. In the discussion we contrasted this result with 
the opportunity and willingness model and concluded that causal logic that applies to the 
interstate conflict does not adequately describe the situation of exclave’s separatism and 
therefore a further research into this area is needed.
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Introduction 
 
“Enclaves are given attention in national politics in a volume disproportionate to their 
population and territorial weight.”  
 
The quote of Evgeny Vinokurov (2006) relevantly describes the situation prevailing in most 
of the countries whose territory is characteristic for its discontinuity and division into two or 
more parts. Indeed, enclaves influence the relations and politics of the mother state, the state 
to which they legally belong, with its surrounding state, often to a much greater extent that 
could be assumed when accounting for enclave’s population or geographical area. However, 
despite their crucial role in the national realm, enclaves remain an under-researched 
phenomenon of international relations and often are presented as local inconvenience 
doomed to extinction. 
Nevertheless, numerous issues connected with enclaves reflect also the usual major problems 
of managing interstate affairs, such as demands of economic liberation, creation of effective 
administrative structures or secessionist and irredentist claims. It is possible that the 
phenomenon of enclaves escapes broader academic attention due to their relatively low 
appearance and because they are still regarded as state’s domestic issue. However, closer 
inspection of the political map of the world reveals that some of the enclaves, either true or 
ethnic, play a significant role in international politics due to their convenient geopolitical 
location, such as Gibraltar or Kaliningrad, or their inherent proneness to ethnic conflict, as is 
the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia or Kosovo. 
The topic of enclaves has been researched predominantly in terms of political geography, 
using descriptive methodology rather than searching for causalities or observing 
commonalities in the patterns of their behaviour. Therefore, the main focus of this thesis will 
aim for a more comparative approach, examining the reasons that motivate enclaves to 
demand independence from their mother states. Selecting the cases of Cabinda and Oecussi 
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will enable us to conduct this comparison 
using the qualitative comparative analysis, 
firstly presented in the field of social 
sciences by Charles Ragin in 1987. The 
selection of the cases reflects our intention 
to find enclaves that are to large extent 
similar in their historical past, territorial 
character and level of inconvenience that 
results from their enclaved position. Despite 
these similarities, the final outcome in the enclaves significantly differs, with Cabinda 
striving for independence from Angola and Oecussi claiming lasting loyalty to its mother 
state, East Timor.  
According to the academic literature on territoriality, the enclaves’ unfavourable situation of 
being divided from its mother state by a territory of another state should have a decisive 
impact on the conduct of the relations between these three main actors. However, as we will 
demonstrate in this paper, the inconveniences resulting from the territorial character of the 
enclave are not the main determinant of the separatist tendencies and therefore we will prove 
that the territory does not have such a significant impact on the interstate or intrastate 
relations as it is suggested. 
The research in this topic is definitely a new addition to the existing literature on separatism, 
as the majority of the literature restricts itself to the continuous territorial units. However, 
enclaves as territory-specific phenomena enable us to re-examine the territorial approach to 
the international relations theory and bring a broader understanding of the role of nation’s 
territorial attachment and the importance of boundaries in the globalised world. Therefore, 
the main research question would be formulated as follows:  
What are the main factors determining enclave’s desires for independence and to what 
extent is this desire connected to the enclave’s territorial character? 
This question will be in the central focus of this thesis. In order to present the situation in a 
  6 
clear schematic vision, we will use the triangle introduced into the enclaves’ literature by 
Robinson (1959) and Vinokurov. They illustrate the situation as a triangle of relations 
between the three main actors, the enclave, its mother state and the surrounding state. As the 
question of separatism is inherently intranational, we will focus only on the enclave – mother 
state relationship. Under the term ‘mother state’ we understand the state which is the 
sovereign authority over enclave’s territory. Both the mother state and the enclave are two 
parts of the same state, even though its territory separated by another state entity (see Tab. 
1). The typical and well known example is Russia, who is a mother state to its Kaliningrad 
exclave, or Great Britain that is a mother state to Gibraltar. The surrounding state, on the 
contrary, merely shares borders with the enclave and therefore prevents it from direct access 
to its mother state.  
In addition, focusing on the relations between the mother state and the enclave will enable us 
to observe the influence of the territory more clearly than in any other case. If we correctly 
applied the underlying theory from the literature on territoriality, it would be expected that 
the division of the state into two parts will result in tensions that would be not be otherwise 
salient in a states with continuous territory. 
In order to examine this, we selected the already mentioned exclaves Cabinda and Oecussi, 
both of which suffer from underdeveloped connections to their mother state and therefore 
represent perfectly the unfavourable aspect of divided territory. However, the contrasting 
attitudes towards separatism in both enclaves clearly point towards another variable that has 
a modifying effect on the causal logic of the influence of the territory on the relations 
between and within states.  
In order to present the prevailing trends in the territoriality literature, the first part of this 
thesis will offer a theoretical background on the importance of territoriality. We will also 
review the major works of academics focusing on enclaves, such as Robinson, Catudal, 
Vinokurov or Nies. Later, we will define the most basic terms and offer a structured 
typology of enclaves and similar geographical phenomena. This part aims to present the key 
concerns of the existing research and explain the importance of additional insight into this 
topic.  
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The second part presents the research design that will be used when analysing the enclave – 
mother state relationship. Using the qualitative comparative analysis, we will analyse the 
cases of Cabinda and Oecussi by comparing selected variables. While the majority of 
variables will focus on the territorial character of the enclave, in order to determine its 
strength, we will also account for other possible explanations to demands of independence, 
namely historical attachments to other state entities. 
Differing from the prevailing stream in the academic literature on territoriality, our main 
assumption the impact of the territory is not the only explanation to the separatist demands. 
Based on the examples of Cabinda and Oecussi, we will demonstrate that the historical 
relations between the enclave and the mother state have much stronger influence on the 
creation of separatist demands. 
In the discussion part we will put our findings into broader perspective and contrast them 
with the opportunity and willingness model of Harvey Starr that attempts to present the 
underlying causal logic in the international relations. Finally, the conclusion will sum up the 
key points of this research. 
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Theoretical background  
The main theoretical interest of this thesis lies in re-evaluating the role of territory in 
intrastate relations. While several political scientists, such as Diehl and Goertz (1988) and 
Vasquez and Henehan (2001), focus on the circumstances when state’s wage war in order to 
gain new lands, our intention is to examine the specific case when enclaves attempt to break 
away from their mother state. According to the reviewed literature, the desire for 
independence should be caused predominantly by territorial inconveniences of the exclave, 
such as difficult administration of the exclave or limited communication with the mother 
state.  
This part of the thesis will therefore firstly present the current trends in political geography 
that emphasise the role of territory in influencing state’s behaviour. Secondly, a 
terminological section will explain the main difference between the terms enclave and 
exclave and then classify the various types of enclaves and similar territorial phenomena.  
 
Territoriality and the inherent importance of land to international actors  
The term territoriality is defined variously. While geographers and anthropologists consider 
it strictly as delimitation of boundaries and existence of state within its borders, political 
scientists regard it as “spatially defined political rule” (Geomans, 2006, 25). Also, Anderson 
and O’Dowd (1999) view territoriality solely as a spatial strategy designed to affect, 
influence and control resources by exerting influence over certain area. While our 
understanding of this term will be limited to the geographical aspects of the state and its 
parts, it is essential to explain the assumed connection between states, nations and territory.  
As we have mentioned, the role of territoriality in the conduct of international relations has 
been researched by many political scientists (i.e. Vasquez, 2003; Senese, 2005; Diehl, 1996; 
Goertz, 1988; Hensel, 1996). The preponderant majority of them examined the influence of 
territorial characteristics on the onset, conduct and settlement of violent disputes leading to 
war. The main focus has been the significance of contiguity, examining how much the 
spread of a conflict depends on the distance of countries, and the role of territorial demands 
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as the main reasons for waging wars.  
The sudden increase in interest in territorial issues has been intriguing for many scholars. 
Diehl (1996) maintains that the decline in territorial concerns was simultaneous with the 
stabilisation of the colonial world, when the colonial empires were not able to acquire any 
more terra nullis territories. The renewed interest in the topic appeared simultaneously with 
the demise of the Soviet Union, motivated by the desires of new nations for their own 
territorial delimitations. Also, Starr (2000) noticed that the role of geography became 
increasingly emphasised with connections to the limits of international decision-makers. 
Acknowledging that territory and its characteristics have a significant impact on 
international politics nowadays became the main interest of many recent researches, 
specialising on questions of democracy, diffusion of war or conflict management.  
Such researches often revealed that when conflict is motivated by territorial disputes, the 
probability that it will escalate to war is considerably higher than when it based on 
ideological or religious grounds (Vasquez & Henehan, 2001; Senese & Vasquez, 2003; 
Diehl, 1996). However, the review of the available literature revealed that while many of 
these researches focus on interstate conflict, there is a very limited number of articles that 
examine the situation on the intrastate level (Diehl & Goertz, 1998; Tir, 2006). As our thesis 
attempts to determine the influence of territory on the intrastate level, we had to abstract 
some of the general principles that seem to influence states’ action on the international field 
and apply them to national level with some minor changes. In order to understand different 
perspectives on this issue, we examine the core principles of realist, territorial and normative 
perspectives on territoriality.  
Assessing the matter from purely territorial perspective, it is possible to argue that in order 
for a nation state to exist, a well-defined and controlled territory is necessary. Senese (2005) 
maintains that this is the reason why territorial disagreements are often viewed as essential 
threat to state’s security. In addition, he states that humans have an intrinsic desire for 
divided land, which explains why states automatically feel threatened and vulnerable when 
their borders are contested (Senese & Vasquez, 2003). This is conveniently demonstrated on 
the example of British defence ministry, when the possibility of losing British sovereignty 
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over Falklands to Argentina in 1982 raised questions of potential loss of other territories 
under British command (Hensel, 1996). According to the author, government focus its 
attention in this situation more on the prevention of such domino- effect than actual 
resolution of the Falkland issue. This situation illustrates that indeed, when faced with 
potential loss of territory, state expresses much stronger reaction that would initially be 
expected. In our case of separatism this phenomenon plays an important role, as it 
acknowledges that certain concerns for a state have a higher priority than others, especially 
when it is connected to territory and its loss.  
In order to discover the reasons for this attachment, we need to examine more closely the 
content of territory. While some territorial disputes have been initiated by desire for valuable 
commodities and resources, contemporary struggles for border and territorial adjustments are 
caused by the population factor, attempting to include or exclude specific ethnic or religious 
groups (Hensel, 1996). Therefore, it is possible to conclude that “territory’s economic and 
strategic values represent different manifestations of the tangible dimension of land’s value; 
territory’s ethnic value represents the sole manifestation of land’s intangible value” (Tir, 
2006, 315). In other words, while territory has a strategic and economic value, its importance 
is also created by the people who inhabit it and their value for state’s existence. For example, 
the importance of the enclaves Ceuta and Melilla for Spain is not only in their strategic 
location close to the Gibraltar strait. Spain’s connection to these cities originates also in the 
fact that both of them are inhabited by the same nationality as the contiguous state and 
therefore there exists a sense of belonging to each other. The value of these cities is thus 
comprised of both strategic and ethnic aspects.  
Realist position, nevertheless, emphasizes especially the tangible dimension of this 
connection, presented by strategic and economic benefits. Example of a struggle over 
territory because of these reasons can be the case Iraq-Kuwait dispute over border 
delimitation which was motivated by concerns over oil reserves.  
However, not all disputes can be explained by purely realist position. Current examples of 
separatism of South Ossetia, Abkhazia or the creation of Transdniester republic do not 
demonstrate desires for neither strategic nor economic gains. As it has been criticized by 
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Forsberg (1996), norms are often regarded by the realists as mere justifications of territorial 
claims. But it is exactly at this point where the normative position to territorial disputes 
offers credible explanations.  
Normative reasons, according to Forsberg (1996), can offer more adequate explanations of 
the mentioned disputes because they express the feeling that the disputed land belongs to 
‘us’ rather than to others. South Ossetia, Abkhazia or Transdniester republic have all been 
motivated exactly by the same feeling, feeling that the inhabitants of the region are more 
connected to other entity, in this case Russia, than to the state they were officially part of. 
Also, many cases of current border disputes are initiated because of seemingly unfair 
historical changes, rather than by economic gains (Ibid.). The two dominant normative 
claims to territory are based on the right to self-determination and historical changes. 
According to Forsberg (1996, 437) both of these claims “are powerful because they have 
origins in value (greatest possible freedom and protection against violations of the rights of 
ownership) that are widely accepted and deeply sedimented as normative bases of most 
western societies”. Similarly, Knight (1982) argues that territory should be understood in 
context with sovereignty, as it is the fundamental source of identity for both the inhabitants 
and the state. Consequently, because the state is the highest form of protection of its 
inhabitants, the necessity to maintain it evolves into a stable and persistent norm. Perfect 
illustration of this argument is the case of Cabinda, which will be examined in the case 
study. After Cabinda’s incorporation into Angola, the exclave automatically reacted by 
creation of independence movement, even before it experienced other discrimination by 
Angola. The prevailing norm was to protect its sovereignty and remain a separate state, 
disregarding potential benefits that the union with Angola could bring,  
In addition, Forsberg (1996) claims that economic and strategic importance of territories is 
limited, based on the low salience of such disputes. While strategically important regions 
such as Bosporus and Danish Straights should be the primary sources of tensions, this is not 
the case. On the contrary, the most salient border conflicts emerge over territories with 
disputed ethnical and nationalist background, such as Nagorno Karabakh or former East 
Pakistan. Senese and Vasquez (2003) agree with this statement and add that it is especially 
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historical changes of borders that increase the possibility of conflict, because they often 
divide various ethnic and social links.  
As it has been stated by Senese and Vasquez (2003, 277), “the non-realist territorial 
explanation of war maintains that states that settle their borders can be expected to have long 
periods of peace ... ; whereas from a realist perspective the struggle for power with its danger 
of war never disappears.” Judging from the current political situation, it indeed appears that 
even though some states enter into conflict because of realist motivations, the most salient 
disputes are those originating in historical, ethnical or religious backgrounds. Diehl (1996, 3) 
expresses similar view when he states that domestic concerns, such as “ethnic and linguistic 
ties between one‘s own population and those living in the disputed territory” are the most 
common cause of military conflict.  
In conclusion, we have found that both territorial explanations and normative perspectives 
have the most explanatory power. However, as we have stated before, the mentioned 
researches have focused mostly on international level and examined the situation from the 
perspective of two or more states. Our study, limiting itself in scope solely to the relations 
between the exclave and its mother state, will therefore fill in the gap in this academic field.  
 
Literature review: Volcanoes or phenomena doomed to extinction? 
As it has been remarked by numerous scholars of political geography (Berger, 2010; 
Catudal, 1974; Farran 1955; Nies, 2007; Robinson, 1959), on the political map of the world 
enclaves represent a specific phenomenon violating the general principle of territorial 
compactness. Nevertheless, enclaves rarely attract necessary amount of scholarly attention 
that would enable political scientists and also other international actors to understand more 
precisely their special political role and their effect on relations between states. As 
Vinokurov (2006) states, the significance of enclaves can be demonstrated on the fact that 
they have an influence on both the mother state and the surrounding state, that is quite 
disproportionate with their small territorial area.  
The literature on enclaves is narrow and predominantly limited to the field of political 
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geography, focusing on the description of enclaves, their typology and geographical 
distribution throughout the world. Enclaves have been used as an analytical tool to assess the 
quality of international relations between states only by Susanne Nies (2007) and Evgeny 
Vinokurov (2007). A post-structuralist, collective identity approach is presented in the work 
of Berger (2010), determining the manner by which multiple agencies form enclave’s 
identity. The following literature review attempts to distinguish prevailing trends in the 
scholarly debate and characterise its weaknesses.  
The theoretical background was established in the works of Farran, Robinson and Catudal 
after the Second World War, as the process of decolonisation initiated a debate concerning 
the right of colonial powers to their empire overseas and the governance of territories 
disconnected from the home country. Areas such as Gibraltar, Cabinda, Hong Kong or 
Macao were of strategic and economic importance to colonial empires and therefore they 
were often unwilling to cede them to the surrounding country. Continuous disputes over 
these territories led scholars to believe that such an arrangement will be temporary and with 
consolidation of nation-states such territorial anomalies will disappear (Farran, 1955; 
Melamid, 1968).  
The branch of scholarly debate observing the special territorial characteristic of enclaves 
includes mostly academic articles published during the Cold War. The understanding of 
enclaves as presented by Charles d’Olivier Farran predominantly focuses on their anomalous 
character, which he considers to be potential source of conflicts in international relations and 
predicted their early extinction (Farran, 1955). His use of the term ‘enclave’ is considerably 
broad, as he applies it also to the entities which are located within a range of natural barriers, 
such as Himalayas or complex river systems, thus depriving the concept of its current 
political connotation. This definition nevertheless enables him to acknowledge the 
importance of territory and communication links with the otherwise inaccessible world. In 
general, Farran’s reasoning predicting early extinction of enclaves is founded on solid 
arguments, such as the dominance of nation-state and attempts of the most convenient 
administration arrangement. Nevertheless, with the demise of the Soviet Union additional 
enclaves were created and many of those with pre-Westphalien origins still persist to exist. 
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Following Farran’s arguments, it is impossible to explain their protracted existence and 
therefore a search for possible factors which maintain enclaves’ existence is necessary.  
Robinson (1959) attempts to offer such explanation and structures his arguments from 
strictly political geography perspective. The main reason is grounded in the relations of three 
participants, respectively the motherland, the surrounding state and the enclave itself. The 
future of the enclave depends on the desire of all three parties to maintain the status quo in 
the area and to prevent undesirable conflicts that could arise over this issue. This triangular 
model was later adapted and further specified by Russian scholar Vinokurov (2005, 59), who 
employed this so-called MES triangle as an analytical tool for thorough examination of the 
case of Kaliningrad.  
An example of the political constraints functioning within this triangle could be the case of 
Switzerland, when the German exclave Büsingen filed a request to be integrated into Swiss 
territory. Nevertheless, Switzerland’s fear that currently weaker neighbour might grow 
stronger over the time and reclaim the enclave later prevented it from accepting such a 
proposal (Robinson, 1959, 290). This form of analysing was definitely an important step 
towards appreciation of the situation’s complexity. However, focusing predominantly on the 
question of enclaves’ stability, Robinson disregarded the significance of enclave’s demand 
for separation from its homeland. This question appears especially compelling, as the author 
himself emphasises the importance of uninterrupted territory, thus indirectly assuming that a 
territorial division could potentially lead to separatist or in Bűsingen’s case irredentist 
demands.  
Sharing Robinson’s concern about territorial integrity and thus following political geography 
approach, Honoré Catudal (1974) views enclaves’ existence as essentially disturbing for the 
correct functioning of both surrounding state and the homeland, creating punctured territory 
of the former and a hardly administrable extension of the latter. Valuable contribution of 
Catudal consists in offering a structured typology of enclaves, depending on their origins and 
territorial character, which will be described in more detail further on. Agreeing with Farran, 
he also places emphasis on the importance of correct legal settlement of the transit rights, 
while adding aspects of administration and general political stability that should be analysed 
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when aiming for enclave’s stability. Therefore, he is one of the first authors who contributed 
to the theories of enclaves’ separatism and some of his causal factors will be closely 
described and adopted in the analytical part of this thesis.  
These three authors largely create the basis of the theoretical background from the 
perspective of political geography. The main issues that remained unaddressed can be 
contributed to the fact that the accessibility of information on enclaves throughout the world 
was limited (Vinokurov, 2007) and specific cases, such as contemporary ethnic problems of 
Caucasus region, were at that time non- existent. The demise of the Soviet Union led to a 
creation of three new crucial enclaves, respectively Kaliningrad, Nakhchivan and an ethnic 
enclave Nagorno-Karabakh. While these had been previously a part of one territorial unit, 
the formation of new autonomous republics created considerable tensions in the region. The 
main point of discontent is between the states of Azerbaijan and Armenia due to their 
complicated geographical organisation. The creation of mutual enclave and exclave in the 
states resulted from Stalin’s deliberate policy along the lines of the ancient principle divide 
and impera, divide and rule (Nies, 2007, 137). Assessing Russia’s geostrategic and military 
interests, the case of Kaliningrad gained importance because of its convenient location, being 
surrounded by Lithuania and Poland. This location was of high strategic importance 
especially during the Cold War, as Kaliningrad was used predominantly as a military base 
for possible Russian attack and even after the demise of the Soviet Union the enclave still 
continued to pose problems due to its embedded position in the European Union (Nies, 2003; 
Vinokurov, 2007). Such anomalies and considerably wider access to information invigorated 
the scholarly debate about enclaves’ significance. The contemporary debate on enclaves is 
mostly led by Russian theoretic and analyst Evgeny Vinokurov and researcher Susanne Nies, 
both basing their main arguments based on the classic scholarly works mentioned above.  
The work of Evgeny Vinokurov predominantly systemises the theoretical background and 
combines it with the current developments in the Caucasus region. Basing his new 
conceptual model on Robinson’s view of interrelations between states, Vinokurov presents 
an MES triangle which allows in-depth analysis of the relative position of the three main 
actors. Vinokurov’s main hypothesis is that the sum of the vectors between all three actors 
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can decisively impact on the enclave’s situation. The first vector describes the mother state 
and enclave relations and determines mostly its political system and economics. The second 
vector illustrates the importance of the enclave and the surrounding state relations in terms of 
transit and attempts of the surrounding state to incorporate the enclave into its own territory. 
The third and fourth vector describe the relations between the mainland and the surrounding 
state both on general issues and the issues concerning the enclave, and maintaining that 
especially this last relation “helps reveal the role of enclaves in the bilateral relations of large 
states as well as in world politics of conflict and cooperation” (Vinokurov, 2004, p.49).  
While Robinson examined only the general relations between the mother state and the 
surrounding state, Vinokurov realised that these relations can be decisively formed also by 
the issues regarding the enclave. Vice versa, “should the relations be disturbed, even for 
some matters not related to the enclave, the negative impact on enclave will tend to be large” 
(Vinokurov, 2006, 48). Judging from the significant impact an enclave can have on the 
conduct of policies between two independent states, Vinokurov states that a much wider 
attention should be paid to this territorial anomaly. Nevertheless, he restricts his focus 
predominantly on the international relations perspective, applying his framework as an 
analytical tool, rather then observing the significance of enclaves as a phenomenon by 
themselves. The absence of a clear focus on the characteristic aspects of enclaves connected 
with enclave’s specific status in the field of secessionism, irredentism or territorial 
indivisibility is still remarkable.  
Attempting to fill this gap in the literature, Susanne Nies provides a new systematic 
framework for analysing the inconsistencies in enclaves’ characteristics. Using the model of 
volcanoes, Nies (2003) approximates e.g. the situation in Gibraltar to a dormant volcano due 
to the fact that the situation is not permanently resolved, but does not display any signs of 
conflicting behaviour either. The case of Kaliningrad resembles a volcano already extinct, as 
the major problems with its administration and political significance were connected to the 
bipolar division of the world. On the contrary, the situation on the Caucasus region and the 
unresolved status of Nagorno-Karabakh can be describes as an active volcano, constantly 
displaying signs of unrest and potential conflict. The slight problem connected with this 
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model is that despite accurately describing the current situation, it does not enable creation 
of a broad and applicable general theory. Therefore, one can state that both Nies and 
Vinokurov use the enclaves as analytical tools for assessing the situation in international 
relations.  
A third, significantly different perspective is presented in the work of Stephan Berger. 
Attempting to offer an alternative perspective, he dismisses purely territorial approach and 
emphasises the importance of the collective identity viewpoint. Arguing with post-
structuralist logic, Berger dismisses the premise that territory is something given and 
suggests that “it is human beliefs, practices and actions that give territory meaning, and 
therefore it is crucial to concentrate on actors… and how they construct the territory of the 
enclave vis-à-vis the (mother) state and its surrounding territories” (Berger, 2010, 316). 
Opposing Robinson or Farran, he regards enclaves as capable of independent behaviour in 
attempt to change their current situation to their advantage. By understanding them more as a 
subject than an object in international relations, he allows for more dynamic approach. 
Accepting his claim for necessity of interdisciplinary perspective, we have decided to use 
Starr’s opportunity and willingness model, which indeed allows us to observe the situation 
from both territorial and normative perspective.  
The above mentioned scholarly debate is largely inconsistent and lacks overarching theories 
offering explanations about enclaves’ persistent existence, sources of separatist demands or 
patterns of strong patriotic behaviour. Enclaves are primarily regarded as unstable territorial 
phenomena bound to extinct, due to the increased attempts of states to consolidate their 
territory. They are rarely selected as the main subjects of analysis and merely serve for 
descriptive or analytical purposes. The amount of literature in the field of international 
relations actually using this concept as independent variable that consequently determines 
other political factors is presented by Nies and Vinokurov. However, Vinokurov’s work is 
narrowly focused on the area of former Soviet Union and Nies approaches her cases very 
individually and fails to offer general patterns of behaviour. Therefore, this thesis aspires to 
discern certain commonalities among the existing enclaves. While Vinokurov’s and 
Robinson’s triangular model is very useful analytical tool, due to the limited amount of 
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space we will examine the role of the territory focusing on the mother state – enclave 
relations. As both authors suggested, this vector determines a significant part of enclave’s 
situation and therefore the influence can be most visible and feasible to analyse.  
 
Terminology and the importance of the viewer’s perspective 
Before fully focusing on the individual case studies, the following part will present the 
central working definitions that will be applied throughout the thesis. Agreeing on exact 
definitions will prevent us from comparing incomparable cases and will also emphasise 
certain commonalities that seemingly different cases share.  
Firstly, it is necessary to acknowledge that the term exclave is often used interchangeably 
with the term enclave. However, there is an important distinction, based on the relationship 
of the surrounding state and the mother state to the separated part of a territory. The term 
‘territory’ includes both the land and territorial waters of a state (Vinokurov, 2004). The 
examples of an exclave surrounded by foreign waters are only three, include two exclaves of 
Malawi in Mozambique’s waters and Argentinean Isla Martin Garcia in the waters of 
Uruguay.  
The term ‘exclave’ describes a part of a territory of one particular state that is surrounded by 
other county or countries. The situation is described from the perspective of the state to 
which the exclave belongs, the mother state. For example, it can be stated that Kaliningrad is 
an exclave of Russia, which is its mother state, as they are two territorially divided parts of 
the same state. Enclave, on the contrary, describes a part of a foreign territory that is 
embedded into state’s own territory. This is viewed from the perspective of the state whose 
complexity is disturbed by a foreign presence, which we call the surrounding state. The 
relationship of these two terms can be described on a case of Llivia, which is a small town 
that is officially Spanish, but it is situated in a French territory. Thus, Llivia is a French 
enclave and at the same time a Spanish exclave.  
As it has already been mentioned, the term enclave is often used when describing exclaves, 
which creates considerable amount of confusion when attempting to create typologies and 
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lists. Various definitions have also been presented in the reviewed literature, so the following 
part will try to find their shortcomings and create the main working definition that will be 
applied throughout the thesis.  
One of the oldest definitions appeared in the articles of Raton (1958), who understands 
enclave as a part of state’s territory completely embedded into a territory of another state. 
This definition uses the surrounding state’s perspective and does not mention the additional 
term ‘exclave’ to describe the connection between the outlying part of the territory and its 
mother state. The same perspective is presented also in Robinson’s work (1959, 283) where 
he defines an enclave as “a part of the territory of country entirely surrounded by the 
territory of another country.” Again, the term exclave is absent.  
However, the definition of Catudal (1974, 109) finally addresses the missing link between 
the mother state and its detached part, stating that exclaves are “those territories which, to 
one degree or another, are physically encircled by alien territory”. The use of the term ‘alien 
territory’ does not precisely define the number of countries surrounding the separated area, 
and because this criterion is often decisive when selecting the appropriate term, we will use 
this definition as the least restrictive throughout the thesis.  
Having described the character on enclave from territorial perspective, it is necessary also to 
define its main characteristics which separate exclaves from other similar territorial 
phenomena, such as city states, colonies or protectorates. According to Raton (1958), in 
order for a territory to be an exclave, it has to be an integral part of the mother state’s 
national territory, where inhabitants of an exclave have the same nationality as the citizens of 
the mother state. In addition, for the surrounding state, the enclaves represent completely 
foreign territory that is defined by carefully delimited borders and it is usually not allowed to 
exercise any sovereignty over it.  
The main principle of these characteristics is the indisputable sovereignty of the mother state 
over the exclave. As it has been emphasised by Catudal (1974, 111), “a complete exclave 
(enclave) may never possess its own state personality. It is always subordinate to the country 
to which it belongs.”  
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This principle thus gives answers to the queries whether Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia or 
Transdniester Republic are actual exclaves. Opposing the view presented by Nies (2004), 
these countries cannot be described as exclaves, as they claim a full sovereignty over their 
matters and they are not a real part of any other state. The case of Kosovo might be slightly 
confusing, as both inhabitants of Kosovo and Albania share the same nationality. However, 
before Kosovo’s proclamation of independence in 2008, Kosovo could be described only as 
an ethnic enclave in Serbia, as it was never an official part of Albania. Ethnic enclaves, 
nevertheless, are not the focus of this thesis and therefore such examples will not be further 
examined.  
Before ending this terminological discourse, it is essential to emphasize once again that these 
definitions are very restrictive and “they are not sufficient for a large number of cases with 
similar political and economic characteristics” (Vinokurov, 2004, 5). As it can be observed 
from the annexed list of true enclaves (Tab. 1), it includes only territories that are surrounded 
by one single state. Similarly territorial phenomena such as Gibraltar, Cabinda or 
Kaliningrad are not included, simply because they are either surrounded by more countries 
or they have an access to the sea. The strict definition of an enclave as an outlying part of 
territory that can only be accessed via the land of another state does not allow incorporation 
of these examples.  
However, as Vinokurov (2004) correctly states, the geographical position is not always the 
most important determinant of the enclave’s character. Situations, in which exclaves or other 
similar regions are denied access to their mother state or are being discriminated because of 
their inconvenient location, are many and therefore we do not have to restrict ourselves 
solely to the true enclaves. In order to avoid any terminological confusion, the following part 
will define and categorise other territorial situations that resemble enclaves and still are 
suitable for our analysis.  
 
Specific territorial situations  
In the reviewed literature, a considerable amount of space has been dedicated to the 
typologies of exclaves (Robinson, 1959; Catudal, 1974; Vinokurov, 2004; Nies, 2004), 
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whether based on their territorial characteristics or historical background. As we have 
emphasised in the previous section, the variety of territorial situations resembling enclaves 
necessitates further attention, because certain divided territories may display the same 
enclave-specific characteristics even though they do not fully comply with the narrowest 
definition.  
Therefore, we will firstly focus on the various territorial arrangements of exclaves and 
enclaves and attempt to highlight importance of certain features that could potentially 
contribute to exclaves’ separatist tendencies.  
Having already defined the terms enclave and exclave earlier, the third main type of 
fragmented territorial situation is a semi-enclave. While both enclaves and exclaves are 
completely landlocked, semi-enclaves have a direct access to the coast (Vinokurov, 2004). 
The examples of such semi- enclaves are Cabinda, Gibraltar, Oecussi or Kaliningrad. 
As it has been highlighted earlier, the specific character of enclaves is caused by their 
complete encirclement by other territory, which can potentially result in feelings of being 
distanced from the mother state. Semi-enclaves are considered to be more able to 
communicate with their mother state (Vinokurov, 2004), as their direct access to sea routes is 
supposed to eliminate the distance factor.  
Nevertheless, it appears that despite their access to the sea the semi-enclave can experience 
the same feeling of isolation from its mother state as a true enclave, which can be 
demonstrated on the example of Oecussi. Despite its access to the coast, the general 
economic and administrative conditions are so unfavourable that the exclave experiences the 
isolation in highest level possible. Of course, the isolation can be attributed also to numerous 
other factors, but this solely serves to demonstrate that the access to the sea does not 
inevitably lead to exclave’s stability.  
The following typology attempts to present other specific territorial situations based on the 
relationship to the surrounding states and the coast. A schematic depiction of each of these 
situations can be found in the Appendix 1.  
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True enclaves – True enclaves, such as Llivia and Campione d’Italia, are both enclaves in 
respect to their surrounding state and exclaves in respect to their mother state. They fulfil 
Catudal’s (1974) condition of being projections of one state into the other and being fully 
encircled by one alien territory. According to Nies (2003), true enclaves can be further 
divided to territorial enclaves, encircled by land and island enclaves, surrounded solely by 
territorial waters of another state. The list of true enclaves is annexed as Table 1. The main 
factors that are expected to increase enclave’s demands for independence are e.g. 
unfavourable transit rights with the surrounding state, economic barriers or feeling of 
discrimination from the side of its mother state.  
Near enclaves – Also called pene-enclaves, these are “parts of the territory of one country 
that can be approached conveniently ... only through the territory of another state” 
(Robinson, 1949, 283). The most famous example of pene-enclave is Austrian village of 
Jungholz that is connected to the mother country by a single geographical point on the top of 
a mountain. Such cases can be considered as exclaves, as they experience the same 
difficulties in the communication with their mother state.  
Pure exclaves – Pure exclaves are those territorial units that are bordering with more states 
at the same time and therefore are not enclaves. Accordingly, the enclave specific 
characteristics of isolation do not always have to be present (Vinokurov, 2004). An 
illustrating case is the one of Nakhichevan. Despite Azerbaijan’s negative relations with 
Armenia, the enclave can ensure its prosperity by communication with its mother state 
through the other neighbouring countries. Therefore, the importance of free transfer is 
significantly decreased, as the possibility of transit, economic trade and communication can 
be spread to more countries.  
Semi-enclaves – Also described as coastal fragments or coastal territories, these territorial 
units have a direct access to the sea and therefore the communication with their mother state 
is facilitated (Raton, 1958). Semi-enclaves can be further divided into two categories, 
depending on the number of neighbouring countries. The example of semi-enclave with only 
one surrounding country is a fragment of East Timor, Oecussi, then Gibraltar or Ceuta 
(Catudal, 1974). The second type is a fragment surrounded by more than one state, as is the 
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case of Kaliningrad. Other examples of this second type would be Angolan Cabinda 
surrounded by the Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo, and Croatian Dubrovnik 
partly surrounded by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. Similarly as pure exclaves, 
the importance of territory decreases with the increased number of neighbours and additional 
access to the sea.  
Enclaved states – In this case, “the territory of one state is entirely surrounded by another 
state” (Farran, 1955, 295). These territorial situations cannot be described neither as exclaves 
nor enclaves, as they are not territorial extensions of another state and they possess full state 
sovereignty (Catudal, 1974, 110). On the contemporary political map, there are only three 
examples of enclaved states, namely Lesotho within South Africa and Vatican and San 
Marino within Italy.  
Few other categories have regularly appeared in the literature on enclaves, mostly with 
regard to the historical territorial phenomena appearing during the colonisation period, such 
as condominiums, or neutral territories that are still persisting. Other interesting categories 
include ‘virtual enclaves’ and ‘temporary enclaves’. However, as they are not crucial to our 
research, we will not examine them in further detail.  
The presented variety of geographical and border situations enables political scientists to 
construct complex typologies and accordingly categorise territorial phenomena on the 
political map. For the purposes of the following research, we will select only examples that 
demonstrate exclave’s strong dependence on the relations with its mother state.  
Basing the following research design on the assumptions present in the literature, our main 
attention will be focused on the territorial aspects that are expected to deteriorate the 
relations with the mother state and thus lead to increased demands of independence.  
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Research design 
As it has been highlighted in the literature review, territory is often expected to play a 
significant role in the conduct of international relations. However, such an assumption could 
be made only if we accepted a straightforward causality between territory and demands of 
separatism. Accepting Berger’s (2010) position that the study of international relations 
deserves an interdisciplinary approach and observing the selected cases, we claim that pure 
territorial concerns are not a sufficient reason for an enclave to demand independence. The 
selected cases of Cabinda and Oecussi clearly demonstrate that despite very similar 
geographical circumstances and disadvantages the outcome is radically different, which 
points towards an additional variable that mitigates the influence of the territory. Therefore, 
we can formulate the central hypothesis as follows.  
Central hypothesis: In the context of the enclave – mother state relations, the demands for 
independence are formed by two clusters of variables, those influenced by the territorial 
arrangement of the enclave and those connected to enclave’s historic developments 
. 
Qualitative comparative analysis  
As we have mentioned in the previous parts, the number of enclaves in the world that could 
be suitable for a proper analysis is limited. The selected cases of Cabinda and Oecussi are 
one of the few exclaves that have a larger area than that of a regular city and therefore can be 
assessed as a compact region, rather than a small territorial inconvenience, as is the case of 
Llivia or Büsingen. Due to the limited number of suitable cases, we had to select a research 
method that would enable us to make relevant and general arguments even despite the 
limited number of cases. 
The qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) presented by Charles Ragin in 1987 meets these 
requirements, as it allows making strong causal links based on only small N number of cases. 
The QCA attempts to bridge the gap between the qualitative and quantitative methods by 
examining cross-case patterns, which “respects the diversity of cases and their heterogeneity 
with regard to their different causally relevant conditions and contexts by comparing cases as 
  25 
configurations” (Ragin, 1987, 3). Thus, social scientists are able to compensate the lack of 
suitable cases by comparing numerous variables that constitute the case as a whole. This way, 
the complexity of the situation is preserved and the considerable number of variables ensures 
that the results of the research can be generalized. 
The basic foundation of the QCA is the cluster of positive cases that exemplify the desired 
outcome (Ragin, 1987). In our case, the case of Cabinda fully complies with the expectations 
of the territoriality literature. Because of its territorial character, it experiences disadvantages 
connected to the division from its mother state, such as discrimination and exploitation of its 
natural resources. Accordingly, Cabinda’s separatist movement FLEC (Frente para a 
Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda) is 
demanding independence by military means since 1960s.  
The QCA also requires some negative cases, which “might seem to be candidates for the 
outcome but nevertheless failed to display it” (Ragin, 1987, 5). This is the case of Oecussi, 
which despite being completely isolated from East Timor and suffering from its inconvenient 
location still rejected any possibilities of incorporation into its surrounding state, Indonesia, 
arguing with strong attachment to East Timor.  
Otherwise, the exclaves share very similar characteristics. Both Cabinda and Oecussi are 
coastal exclaves, once belonging to Portuguese overseas empire. Later they were 
incorporated into another state, with considerably bad economic and administrative situation, 
and slightly different ethnic origins that their mother states. Cabinda experiences large scale 
exploitations of its vast natural resources of oil by its mother state Angola and Oecussi 
suffers from insufficient funding and limited communication with its mother state, East 
Timor. In addition, both of these regions have an access to the sea, which is expected to limit 
the unfavourable territorial character because of the possibility to reach their mother state by 
water. Due to these similarities we are confident to state that the selected cases fully comply 
with the first two QCA requirements.  
The following step of the QCA is to determine the major causal conditions which could 
potentially lead to the observed outcome. According to the reviewed literature, the territorial 
inconvenience should be the main determinant of the desire for independence. However, the 
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obvious disparities between these two cases point towards another causal mechanism. 
Judging from the literature review, the role of norms in the society is also expected to have 
certain effect on the significance of the territory and the state. Therefore, we claim that it is 
not only territorial inconveniences that motivate exclaves to separatism, but also historical 
attachments to another state entity that influence the final outcome of the initially 
unfavourable territorial circumstances. 
In order to conduct the desired analysis, it is essential to describe some of the independent 
variables that are expected to have a significant impact on the enclave’s demands of 
separation, both from territorial and historical perspective. Aiming to intensify the impact of 
the territory, only factors describing the relations between the mother state and the enclave 
have been selected. As it has been mentioned earlier, it should be these territorial factors that 
have the ability to significantly deteriorate the situation of an enclave, or at least contribute 
to its feeling of being discriminated. The overall mother state - enclave relationship is thus 
segmented into the following independent variables, each of which attempts to discover the 
sources of potential tensions between the two territories.  
 
History 
The impact of the history of the enclave is one of the less researched variables in this paper, 
as the main focus lies on the question of territoriality. Nevertheless, it is our assumption that 
there is a direct link between the demands for independence and the historical relations 
between the enclave and the mother state. As we have mentioned in the theoretical 
background, the value of the territory is also constructed in the minds of its inhabitants, 
presented by a set of norms and expectations. Let us again quote Berger (2010, 316) who 
states that it is human beliefs and actions that “construct the territory of the enclave vis-à-vis 
the (mother) state and its surrounding territories.” 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that when a region experiences an unjust transfer of 
sovereignty, as was the case of Cabinda, the inhabitants are likely to create an aversion 
towards their new sovereign. Such positive or negative attitudes towards other state entities 
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can consequently determine the prevailing attitudes in the country, whether aiming for 
independence or claiming loyalty. As we have not found extensive literature on this subject, 
this thesis could also contribute to this field of study. 
 
Ethnic identity  
The factor of ethnic identity is perhaps the most difficult to analyse. General literature on 
ethnic separatism, regionalism and nationalism often presents cases where ethnic identity is 
being observed as dependent or independent variable. Perspective adopted by Jayant Lele 
(1980) explains that appearance of ethnic narratives results from factors such as 
developmental imbalance or consequences of colonialism, eventually because “a modern 
individual lives in world of fluid structures and hence must resurrect culture in order to give 
himself a sense of identity” (Lele, 1980, 202).  
According to Etherington (2007), especially strong ethnical feelings are created in countries 
that did not experience democratic movements, and that are therefore unable to link the 
feeling of nationality to the general democratic principles. In order to create a firm basis of 
their identity, they turn towards alternative narratives (Etherington, 2007). Consequently, 
these countries create exclusive relations between nation and territory, and their 
understanding of nation is based on ethnic markers instead of democratic principles. 
Categories such as common origin and descent are sufficiently strong to exclude other 
nationalities from state’s territory and thus they protect the state and make it unique. Thus, 
“the territorial claims of civic nations … are limited to the existing boundaries of the state, 
and thus they pose little territorial threat to neighbouring nations” (Etherington, 2007, 30).  
Similar attitude is expressed in a sociological article of R. Couto (1993), who emphasises the 
importance of the feeling of inferiority in certain social groups. His observation that “the 
awareness of economic subordination and political repression of a group by its members 
reminds them constantly of the inaccuracies of the prevailing explanations of these 
inequalities” (Couto, 1993, 61) has a high explanatory power and can be well applied to the 
case of enclaves. Because of enclaves’ peripheral location from the mother state, they can 
  28 
often feel neglected and regard the inequality between the living standards or manner of 
administration as especially disturbing. In these cases, the differences in ethnic composition 
of the inhabitants can serve as a legal ground for demanding independence via the right to 
self-determination. Therefore, while in more positive circumstances this would be 
disregarded, when faced with other unfavourable conditions the ethnic identity can be 
‘exploited’ and used in exclave’s advantage.  
However, the ethnicity factors do not always have to be considered as a secondary reason for 
independence. The importance of the ethnic factor can be illustrated demonstrated on the 
separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, which is often explained as resulting from 
different ethnical background of East Pakistan’s inhabitants (Baxter, 1984).  
When attempting to analyse the motives leading to enclave’s independence, we have to be 
careful to distinguish whether the ethnicity was a primary or a secondary source of 
discontent. For example, Gold (2010) emphasizes the primary role of ethnicity when 
describing the case of Gibraltar. According to him, the events of the Second World War and 
the strategic importance of Gibraltar leading to the victory of the Allied powers created a 
strong national link between the inhabitants of Gibraltar and Britain. Gold then argues that 
this ‘connectedness’ to the British nationality played a crucial role in forming the 
Gibraltarians’ identity and it was a strong feeling of betrayal and unreciprocated loyalty from 
the side of British government that eventually furthered Gibraltar’s demands for increased 
autonomy (O’Reilly, 1999). However, it remains questionable whether the reason that 
Gibraltar remains in British possession is indeed this ethnical link, or whether there are other 
reasons that motivate Britain to maintain its firm hold on its former colony. This is thus an 
illustrative example where realist and normative understanding of territoriality clash, the 
former arguing with strategic interests and the latter with the inherent value of ethnicity. In 
the case of selected enclaves, we will see that the ethnicity is considered mostly from the 
normative and historical perspective, arguing with sentimental attachments to certain ethnic 
group. 
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Effectiveness of administration  
Administration and the ties that are created between the enclave and the mother state are of 
the utmost importance when considering enclave’s stability. Especially two aspects of the 
administration need to be examined more closely.  
Firstly, in order to ensure enclave’s stability after proclaiming its independence, it is essential 
that the existing administrative is fully effective. Unless the existing administrative structures 
adopt the responsibilities until then performed by the mother state, the enclave will not be 
able to maintain its political stability.  
Secondly, the essential challenge for the main state’s administration is to prevent creation of 
doubled structures on the enclave level (Nies, 2003) and simultaneously to maintain effective 
control over the discontinuous territory (Robinson, 1959). According to Catudal (1974, 133) 
the efficacy of administration implies also physical security, as “the territory becomes 
closely identified with the national state and any attempt by the neighbour to alter the status 
quo must take its military capability into serious consideration.”  
The proceedings in Gibraltar appropriately demonstrate how the loosening of administrative 
structures is tightly connected to expressing discontent with political dependency. Gibraltar 
has been demanding looser colonial administration in its territory and its Chief Minister 
stated that the main ambition is “to achieve decolonisation, to shed the colonial status 
through a process of constitutional modernisation ... while preventing a status of political 
dependency with the UK” (O’Reilly, 1999, 72). This statement clearly illustrates the links 
between imposed administration and feelings of being pressured and dependent on the other 
country.  
Interestingly, the missing administrative structures can also be the result of deliberate actions 
of the government. As Vinokurov (2005, 61) argues, “direct governance and some restriction 
of local democracy is likely to happen in order to ensure the mainland’s full sovereignty” 
(Vinokurov, 2005, 61). In our case study, this intention of the mother state can be 
demonstrated on the case of Angola. The mother state repeatedly rejected Cabinda’s 
demands for a democratic referendum which would decide whether the enclave will or will 
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not remain a part of Angola, in fear of its separation. 
The probable tensions linked to the administration aspect can be created by discriminating 
the enclave by its mother state, e.g. because of the excessive cost of the maintenance.  
In cases where such discrimination occurs, the mother states should carefully calculate the 
potential outcomes of these policies along the cost-benefit lines, as the any discrimination 
increases the chances of secession. As Kennan argues, “the effectiveness of the power 
radiated from any national center decreases in proportion to the distance to the distance 
involved” (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2009, 189) and therefore establishing looser administration 
may result in the mother state loosing complete control over the enclave.  
To sum up, it is expected that discriminating administration towards the enclave, originating 
in its territorial detachment from the mother state, increase the probability of its demands for 
independence. On the contrary, an effective control of an exclave which facilitates the 
communication with its mother state is expected to strengthen their relationship.  
 
Economic concerns 
The economic situation of enclaves is usually unfavourable, as the region is encircled by 
international boundaries that often require setting up the custom tariffs and various income 
taxes. In order to prevent too excessive increase in prices of imported goods, “special 
economic regimes or zones are established in order to offset the danger of economic 
suffocation” (Nies, 2007, 126). As the geographical conditions rarely enable enclave’s self-
sustainability in terms of production or specialisation in certain industry, their main source of 
income originates in trade, or in case of European enclaves in tourism (Catudal, 1974). Due 
to this dependence on the mother state, the economic possibilities and situation of enclaves 
become significant determinants of their separatist demands.  
In order to successfully engage in economic trading, the first condition is unlimited access to 
enclave’s mother state (Robinson, 1959). This is usually conducted through established 
neutral road, concessionary traffic through the surrounding state or by a set-back of customs 
and duties. In certain parts of the world, boundaries are becoming more and more porous 
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because of globalisation and membership of states in various international organisations. 
However, also in the past certain level of assimilation appeared, e.g. in the cases of Büsingen 
and Campione in Switzerland. In both cases, the enclaves used the currency of the 
surrounding state and the border regime was adjusted to include enclave as its proper 
territory (Robinson, 1959; Catudal, 1974).  
Apart from being connected to the economy of its mother state or of the surrounding state, an 
enclave can also decide to pursue an independent economy path, but this one is particularly 
risky if the enclave does not have a significant amount of natural resources or any other 
potential value.  
The problem most notably connected with enclaves is the one of black trade and smuggling. 
As Robinson (1959, 293) correctly states, while “exclaves … may be victims of encirclement 
by their neighbors, they are also in a position to be thorns in their neighbors' sides and can 
profit from a situation which places them inside a neighbor's territory but outside his 
jurisdiction.” This situation led for example to a creation of casino in Campione d’Italia, and 
the enclave gained excessive profits from Swiss citizens, as Switzerland strictly prohibited 
any kind of gambling (Raton, 1958). Similar problems with unlawful trade and activities are 
experienced in Ceuta and Melilla. Because there are no formal borders between Spain and 
Morocco, the smuggling of goods into Europe is very easy.  
Catudal (1974) concludes that as long as economic situation is stabilised either by the mother 
state or by special agreement with the surrounding state, the threat of secession is not that 
large. This has been demonstrated in Büsingen, which is fully enclaved in Swiss territory. 
While the enclave was dependent on uncertain and constantly changing Swiss customs, it 
filed numerous requests for full integration within Swiss territory (Catudal, 1974). However, 
after a treaty has been signed, which created an economic union with the enclave, these 
desires have almost completely ceased to appear.  
This economic variable is to large extent dependable on the territorial situation of the 
enclave. As long as an enclave does not experience the impact of the detachment because of 
convenient economic zone or neutral trade routes, the situation can be expected to remain 
stable. However, when the mother state exploits enclave’s economic resources or it does not 
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take any actions that might diminish the consequences of enclave’s isolation, the threats of 
secession definitely increase.  
 
Transit rights  
In order to maintain dynamic communication between the enclave and its mother state, the 
right of transit through the surrounding state is essential. In case an enclave is not 
economically self- sufficient, denial of the transit right could have catastrophic 
consequences. In those conditions, the territorial character of enclave becomes even more 
apparent than before. Therefore, the ability to maintain contact with the home state is 
fundamental for enclave’s existence, stability (Catudal, 1974) and its satisfaction with the 
mother state’s interest in the matters of the enclave.  
Apart from practical issues, the right of transit is according to several scholars (Farran, 1955; 
Catudal, 1974, Karan, 1960) one of the most important rights of an enclave. The main 
sources of this claim are the principles of the domestic law and the judicial premise 
cuicunque aliquis quid concedit concedere videtur et id, sine quo res ipsa esse non poouit, 
which states that when a certain right is granted to someone, the person should also be able 
to exercise it. As Farran (1955, 804) elegantly puts it, “the law would not recognise the right 
of state A to a detached piece of its territory enclaved in state B's unless it were possible for 
state to use that right.” Consequently, as long as the surrounding state recognises the 
sovereignty of the home state to its enclave, it should implicitly allow for a free transit 
through its territory.  
However, some authors acknowledge that the analogy with the domestic law is limited in its 
application (Karan, 1960) and that “the right of way is by no means absolute, ... the 
contemporary experience shows that at least the ordinary resident enjoys free, if not 
unrestricted access” (Catudal, 1974, 130-131). Expressing the right of transit in such a 
restrictive manner can be demonstrated on the decision of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in a related case of Portugal vs. India, which ruled that the free movement of armed 
troops and police, even though they are necessary for enclave’s security, is subject to the 
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approval of the surrounding country.  
The rights of transit between the enclave and the mother state are several. In the better cases, 
the surrounding and the mother state establish the main rules of territorial transition by 
individual treaties. For example, France enabled completely unhindered passage of military 
troops from Llivia to Spain, as long as it is was conducted via the established chemin neuter, 
neutral road (Raton, 1958). Different case is that of Campione d’Italia where the right of 
transit is set by the usual customs already established between Switzerland and Italy.  
Therefore, it is possible to claim that the right of transit significantly influences the situation 
of an enclave. If the enclave cannot have a convenient access to its mother state, it will feel 
limited in its rights and possibly neglected by the central government. Thuds, it is expected 
that when the home state or enclave is denied the right of transit through the territory of a 
surrounding state, the probability of enclave’s attempts for independence increases.  
In conclusion, the above mentioned variables constitute in our opinion the most important 
features that decisively influence the relations between the mother state and the enclave. 
Combining all these variables and expectations into one central hypothesis, we now move 
towards the individual case studies. 
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Cabinda: Exploitation and demands for independence  
In order to distinguish which of the mentioned variables has a significant influence on the 
separatist tendencies of enclaves, we will firstly examine the positive case of Cabinda. 
Cabinda is a coastal exclave of Angola, surrounded by Congo and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, comprising population of over 300,000 (Press Tribune, 2007). Cabinda has been 
selected to be analysed more closely because of its evident desire to become independent 
from Angola.  
The general situation in Cabinda is very unfavourable. Martin (1977) argues that the strong 
independence tendencies originate in the historical circumstances. Being one of the fist 
people in West Central Africa with a western education, Cabindans were forced to migrate to 
the neighbouring countries in search of a suitable employment, which was not available in 
the limited conditions of the enclave (Ibid.). Consequently, “this continuing inflow and 
outflow of persons as workers, refugees ... provided avenues for the advance of nationalist 
ideas in the colonial period” (Martin, 1977, 51). The emigrants were able to provide a 
foreign base for the operations of FLEC, Cabinda’s largest liberation front, in the 
neighbouring countries and also in Europe.  
Because of the struggles for independence that last already over 30 years, over 30,000 people 
have lost their lives. The access to the enclave is largely limited for all except for the workers 
in the oil industry, which leads to strong resentment over disparities in the treatment of 
Angolans and Cabindans. Despite their major natural resources, which comprise almost so 
and so many percents of Angola’s trade, Cabinda remains abandoned by social services, 
poor, uneducated and the majority of the inhabitants live in huts and slums (Wells, 2003). 
Therefore, the exploitation of its national resources by Angola and other international actors 
causes strong resentment and is used as one of the main arguments for Cabinda’s 
independence.  
 
History: The treaty of Simulambuco and transfer of sovereignty 
Despite exclave’s strict refusal to acknowledge this fact, the historical background of 
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Cabinda was always closely tied to Angola. After the Treaty of Simulambuco from 1885, as 
many other European countries, Portugal claimed direct administrative control over Cabinda 
in return for protection and guarantees regarding the trade (Cornwell, 2000). Cabinda was 
incorporated into Angola only as late as 1956, when it became apparent that the exclave was 
rich in oil and the Salazar’s government joined their administration without consulting 
Cabindans beforehand (Wells, 2000). After the decolonisation period, the link between 
Angola and Cabinda created by the Portuguese remained and since 1975, Cabinda retained 
its status as a district of Angola (Koné, 1998).  
It is exactly the Treaty of Simulambuco that is the foundation of Cabinda’s independence 
claims, as the enclave argues that their original link is with the Portuguese instead of Angola. 
According to these claims, Portugal acknowledged Cabinda as an independent entity that was 
later incorporated into Angola solely for convenience reasons (Cornwell, 2000). 
Nevertheless, it is also emphasised by the author that the ‘special’ nature of this relationship 
with Portugal is ambiguous and in order to make these claims more relevant, a further 
investigation is needed.  
On the other hand, it appears that Cabinda was often neglected by the Angola side. During 
the fights for Angola’s independence from Portugal, the main guerrilla army MPLA was 
based in the Cabinda exclave since 1964 (Martin, 1977). The outlying location of the exclave 
enabled MPLA to launch attacks from across the borders and thus attack the Portuguese 
army from two sides. Nevertheless, the guerrilla lacked support from the Cabinda 
inhabitants, who regarded the Angolans as foreigners and largely refused to participate at 
fighting (Martin, 1977, Cornwell, 2000). In addition, the military activity of MPLA in 
Cabinda diminished the importance of their separatist guerrillas and the transitional 
government decisively rejected Cabindan separatism. Therefore, the deep mistrust between 
Angola and Cabinda even increased and was deteriorated further by the competing for actual 
state power (Cornwell, 2000).  
At the signing of the Alvor Agreement of January 1975, when Portugal allowed Angola full 
independence within its borders, only three parties were present. The MPLA (Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola), UNITA (National Union for the Total 
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Independence of Angola) and FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) all signed 
the Agreement, proclaiming Cabinda an integral part of Angola and thus the exclave became 
independent together with its mother state on November 11, 1975 (Khadiagala, 2005).  
Cabindans continue to reproach Angola for not inviting any party from the exclave to sign 
the treaty as well. They maintain that declaring Cabinda an ‘integral and inalienable’ part of 
Angola required at least presence of any Cabindan representative and a treaty signed without 
their consent is not legally binding (Khadiagala, 2005). Following these events, FLEC 
decided on establishing a provisional government of the Republic of Cabinda, allegedly 
liberalized and independent zone (Wells, 2000). However, due to the lack of international 
interest in the region and aiming to protect their interests in Cabinda’s oil reserves, the 
proclamation of independence of Cabinda did not raise any concerns.  
Most of the contemporary peace attempts focus on fostering understanding between Angola 
and Cabinda, aiming to find a settlement that would be beneficial for both sides. The main 
flaw of these attempts remains the fact that they fail to include the separatist parties, which 
even further fuels the resentment and desire to be independent. This consequently leads to 
the absence of the Cabindan parties at important events, such as the latest Angola’s 
conference on constitutional reform in 2002. Even though the conference aimed at granting 
Cabinda a certain level of local autonomy, the determination of FLEC to achieve their goal 
resulted in renewed fights for self-rule (Eriksson, Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 2003).  
Fortunately, after the 2006 ceasefire the fighting for independence that resulted in over 
30,000 deaths finally stopped (Denhez, 2009). Nevertheless, the attempts of Cabinda to 
separate from its mother state still continue, resulting in often clashed between the exclave 
and Angola. The last reports from the Human Rights Watch revolve around unlawful 
detention of Cabindan journalists, motivated by purely political goals of Angola to silence 
their opposition.  
It is obvious that the negative relations between Cabinda and Angola originated during the 
Portuguese colonial rule, which decided on the incorporation of Cabinda into Angola without 
consulting the region first. Cabinda’s anger at Angola increased by Angola’s use of the 
exclave as a fighting base against the Portuguese and proclamation of the separatist 
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movement as irrelevant by the transitional government. The resentment was later fuelled by 
the decision of the mother state to exclude the Cabinda parties from signing the Alvor 
Agreement in 1975. The strong desire of Cabinda to become independent led to continuous 
guerrilla fighting initiated by FLEC. Even though this was effectively halted in 2006, the 
resentment of the two parties presents itself in continuing acts of unlawful arrests and 
attempts to eliminate the opposition at least politically.  
 
Real and claimed ethnic links 
It has been already stated that the differences in ethnicity are also expected to contribute to 
the desires of independence. The situation in Cabinda regarding the ethnicity is quite 
complicated. While some of the former inhabitants managed to maintain their cultural traits 
and language, a significant portion of the population became assimilated with the 
Portuguese, being schooled in Portugal or by the Protestant missionaries. Therefore, the 
society was a mix of the white or mestico elite, the black assimilated population and the 
native Bakongo and Kikongo speaking tribes (Cornwell, 2003).  
Cabindans are ethnically a part of Bakongo population that inhabit the region of Western 
Democratic Republic of Congo, smaller parts of Congo and north of Angola (Martin, 1977). 
However, Cabindans often refuse to acknowledge their ethnical affinity to a part of Angola 
population and claim that they are more aware of the cultural and traditional ties with their 
Congo-Brazzaville neighbours than of Angola. As Martin (1977) claims, this is due to the 
important linkages between Cabindans and their neighbours that were created by the already 
mentioned constant movement across borders in search of suitable employment.  
Therefore, Cabinda has stronger geographical, linguistic and ethnical links to the Congo-
Brazzaville region and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Nevertheless, the claims for 
independence rarely state these ethnical differences and focus more on the economic and 
administrative discrimination.  
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Economic disadvantages and discrimination  
In Cabinda, the importance of economic ties with the mother state is particularly salient. 
During the colonisation period, Cabinda was used mostly as a port for the trade with slaves. 
After that period has passed, the most significant resources of the exclave consisted of timber 
and agriculture. A rapid shift in economy appeared after 1952, when the Cabinda Gulf Oil 
Company discovered the major resources in oil close the Cabinda’s shore (Martin, 1977). By 
1974, crude oil became the major source of Angola’s export, most of it coming from 
Cabinda. Since then, the exploitation of oil reserves became the crucial reason of Cabinda’s 
independence efforts and the source of all following conflicts.  
The access to oil increased the strategic role of the exclave and throughout the war for 
independence, UNITA, MPLA and FLEC all fought in order to gain control over Cabinda 
(Denhez, 2009). 
Nowadays, Cabinda possesses over 60% of Angola’s oil and generates an overwhelming pat 
of Angola’s foreign currency reserves (Angola Press, 2008). Because of these reserves, 
Cabinda became important also to major players in petroleum industry both in the United 
States and Europe. Firstly dominated by Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, a subsidiary of US firm 
Gulf Oil, it was taken over by Chevron in 1984 (Frynas &Wood, 2001). This takeover marks 
the beginning of vast oil exploitation, which led to worsening of the relations between 
Angola and Cabinda.  
The main problem was the unfair redistribution of the income generated by the trade with oil 
and the neglect of state. However, because the majority of the oil companies is based off 
shore, the Cabindan separatist groups have a limited reach on them. As Buhaug and Rød 
state (2006, 320), “unless the rebels control areas of extraction or transport routes, they 
cannot exploit the lootable commodity for financial gains.” Therefore, the position of 
Cabinda separatists is quite unfavourable and disables them to achieve their goal.  
In addition, the access to such an important commodity helps to marginalise the role of the 
FLEC. Mostly foreign investors in Cabinda, such as Chevron, gain large subsidies in order to 
maintain the trade profitable and more attractive (Reno, 2000). This includes diminishing the 
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FLEC influence as much as possible, because possible separation of Cabinda from Angola 
would threaten the established trade with oil. Therefore, considerable part of the subsidies 
flows to finance MPLA army, in order to suppress any possible uprisings. As Reno (2000) 
states, MPLA regime uses the foreign investors as direct intermediaries to military service 
and weapons.  
Also, because the companies created less destruction to the environment than e.g. in Nigeria, 
the grievances of Cabinda attract considerably low amount of attention from international 
human rights or environmental groups (Frynas & Wood, 2001). Thus, the conflict in Cabinda 
passes generally unnoticed in larger international community and the exclave cannot 
generate enough support to further its goals with foreign aid.  
In order to earn Cabinda’s confidence, in 2006 Angola started a new strategy by announcing 
generous subsidies to the exclave. The plans suggested over $500 million to be assigned to 
Cabinda over a period of two years. They should be invested predominantly into education 
and development of a port that would transform Cabinda into regional transport centre 
(Denhez, 2009). According to the Press Tribune report (2007), Cabinda is currently the 
second richest urban centre in Angola after its capital Luanda and it is awaiting even bigger 
growth in future.  
Nevertheless, these plans are still not able to make Cabindans forget the turbulent economic 
past. The apparent economic disparity when dividing the income from oil reserves still 
enrages exclave’s inhabitants and they view it as a sufficient reason for self-determination 
and independence. Still, it is difficult to tell whether Angola will be able to improve its 
negative image in the enclave despite its renewed attempts of reconciliation.  
 
Constantly changing administrative status of the exclave  
As it has been mentioned, the economic relations between the exclave and the mother state 
are definitely not positive. Cabinda views Angola’s actions regarding the oil trade as highly 
discriminating, due to the fact that the considerable income that Angola gains from oil export 
is not evenly distributed. The reflection of this conflict is therefore visible also on the 
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administration level, where Cabinda suffers from insufficient funding and exploitation.  
Martin (1977) suggests that during the colonisation period there have been various attempts 
to create an administrative link between Cabinda and Angola. For example, at one point the 
government suggested that the capital of the Congo district of Angola should be located in 
Cabinda, in order to minimise exclave’s isolation and also to ensure its economic 
development. The problems connected to Cabinda’s administration can be also demonstrated 
by the fact, that during years 1917 and 1946, the status of the exclave changed seven times 
(Martin, 1977).  
Nevertheless, the problem with its administration remained and was even strengthened by the 
fact that Angola used exclave’s territory to launch attacks at Portuguese army during the war 
of independence. Because of its dense forests, the exclave seemed an ideal ground for 
guerrilla movements, both from Angola’s and Cabinda’s initiative. However, as we already 
mentioned in the previous parts, the presence of MPLA army had negative effects on the 
exclave. Even after Angola’s independence, the MPLA government retained troops in 
Cabinda, in order to suppress any signs of its separatism. Since then, the situation in the 
exclave resembles a state of military occupation. In addition in 1994, the troops seized 
control of Cabinda, which resulted in refugee flow of almost one fourth of Cabinda’s 
population (Koné, 1998). The attempt to set up an effective administration after such 
turbulent past is therefore highly ambitious.  
It has been stated by several authors (Koné, 1998, Wells, 2003) that the population lives in 
extreme poverty, the infrastructure is in desolate state and both educational and 
environmental conditions are in poor state. In addition, until now Cabinda was not able to 
meaningfully represent its interests in Angola’s government, as Angola did not allow any 
democratic vote on independence in near future (Denhez, 2009).  
The newest developments in the administration started with signing of ‘The Memorandum of 
Understanding for Peace in Cabinda’ on August 1, 2006 by both opposing parties (Press 
Tribune, 2007). This document finally grants Cabinda a special status within the country and 
a greater autonomy in managing its own affairs, whether political, social or economic.  
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Nevertheless, the old resentment seems to continue through various means. According to the 
reports from Human Rights Watch (2012, 3), “the authorities continued using the conflict to 
justify restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly, and association.” In March Angola 
resumed the counter-insurgency military operations in the enclave, and the government 
unlawfully imprisons political dissidents. Similarly, any anti-governmental gatherings are 
officially forbidden and several journalists have been sued for defamation (Ibid). The Human 
Rights Watch (2009) also reported serious human rights violations conducted by Angola’s 
security forces, such as torture and denying the people their most basic human rights.  
These defects of administration, continuing discrimination of the exclave’s political rights, 
unlawful imprisonments of opponents to Angola’s government and violations of human 
rights significantly deteriorate the situation. While the economic discrimination is the 
principal source of exclave’s resentment, the continuing attempts of Angola to suppress any 
expression of Cabinda’s desires work as a catalyst of this discontent and do nothing to 
elevate the negative attitudes between these two entities.  
 
Concluding remarks  
The relations between the Cabinda exclave and its mother state Angola are very negative. 
Cabinda’s original link to Portuguese empire was forcefully replaced by its incorporation 
into Angola in 1956. During Angola’s struggle for independence, the exclave was forcefully 
used as a base of military operations of MPLA, which resulted in lasting military presence in 
Cabinda.  
After the large oil reserves of Cabinda were discovered, the mother state took advantage of 
the situation and fought even more strongly against any sign of possible Cabinda’s 
separatism. The loss of Cabinda would definitely deteriorate Angola’s economic situation, as 
the oil trade generates more than 60% of the national GDP. However, the exclave itself 
gained almost no benefit from its vast reserves, as the central government allowed only small 
part of its income to be spent on Cabinda and its administration. The economic 
discrimination of the exclave was therefore one of the major sources of Cabinda’s discontent 
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and demands for self-determination.  
The historical narratives and claimed affinity to Portugal rather than Angola serve to support 
Cabinda’s demands and without strong backing by the economic conditions, they would 
have only dubious relevance. What is surprising is the fact, that slightly different ethnic 
background, that could potentially be used to support claims for self-determination, is only 
rarely applied. The administrative difficulties are motivated predominantly by the economic 
concerns, as Angola is attempting to downplay any potential signs of discontent by limiting 
Cabindans’ political, social, economic or human rights. 
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Oecussi: Isolated but patriotic  
The third specific type of enclave situation with regard to the relations with its mother state 
is that of harmony and satisfaction with its position of an enclave. While the main focus of 
this thesis is aimed at the separatist tendencies of enclaves, it is of vital importance to 
examine also the opposite situation. This will enable us to understand more clearly the role 
of the selected variables and the strength of their influence on the relations of the mother 
state and the enclave.  
As it has been acknowledged by Vinokurov (2004), predominant number of exclaves does 
not experience difficulties connected to their divided territorial character. This can be 
demonstrated on numerous examples, such as Kaliningrad, Llivia or Herzog-Baarle. 
However, it has been our intention to select a case that would be situated in a difficult 
position, in order to analyse which of the selected variables can overcome decisively 
unfavourable circumstances and positively impact on the decision of an enclave to remain 
part of the same state entity. 
The selected case of Oecussi-Ambeno1 conveniently fits with this requirement. Oecussi is an 
exclave of East Timor and it is partly surrounded by Indonesia, possessing also an access to 
the sea. The whole exclave is inhabited by over 67,000 people. Despite enclave’s turbulent 
history connected to the East Timorese separation from Indonesia in 2002 and difficulties 
with trade and transport resulting from its territorial position, Oecussi still maintains strong 
emotional ties to its mother state, East Timor. After a short historical background, an 
explanation of administrative settlement between both parts of East Timor will follow and 
later we will focus on exclave’s ethnical character, its pending economic status and the 
difficulties that the inhabitants encounter when trying to access the mainland’s territory.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 The name of the enclave appears in various forms depending on the source, but based on the United Nations 
terminology the term Oecussi will be used. Other variations include Oe-cussi, Oecusse, Oecussi-Ambeno, Okusi 
or Oekussi. 
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History  
The historical background of East Timor is tightly connected to the expansion of Portuguese 
overseas empire. As Lawless (1976, 948) states, the story of East Timor is best described 
“the modern themes of struggles for self-determination by small ethnic groups against the 
hegemony of artificial nation-states, the disorderly collapse of European colonialism into 
regional imperialism, the often self-defeating idealism engendered by the United Nations.” 
Let us now examine more closely these links, which could potentially lead to understanding 
of today’s situation.  
The area of East Timor was formerly colonised by the Portuguese, while today’s Indonesia 
belonged to the vast Dutch overseas empire. How the Portugal was able to maintain its rule 
over a territory that was fully surrounded by Dutch properties and in such a distinct location 
often remains a mystery to contemporary writers (Hägerdal, 2006). Nevertheless, the 
Portuguese Timor managed to become interlinked into the complicated world system 
because of the importance of sandal wood trade, which was one of its main sources of 
wealth. In addition, the geographical difficulties when accessing this area prevented other 
empires to conquer this territory from Portugal and the Dutch were mostly focused on 
protecting their interests in central Indonesia (Ibid.).  
Nevertheless, the colony itself experienced power struggles between the Topass community, 
Black Portuguese situated in the area of today’s enclave, and the rest of the colony situated 
more eastwards. The Topass community, despite claiming their loyalty to the Portuguese 
empire, “at the same time pursued their own political ways and adopted (or rather inherited) 
many local customs” (Hägerdal, 2006, 16). The government of Portugal thus established 
closer links with the eastern part of the colony and the Topass-dominated area naturally 
evolved into an enclave Oecussi-Ambeno. 
Nearing the end of 19th century, both the Dutch and the Portuguese empire even “formalised 
their shared border in Timor, ensuring that Oecussi remained attached sentimentally, if not 
geographically to Portuguese Timor” (District Profile: Oecusse..., 4). The soft-regime border 
situation between the exclave and West Timor at the same time ensure that the social and 
trade connections continued relatively undisturbed.  
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Even though East Timor became a province of Indonesia in 1975 (Hainsworth, 2000), but 
Indonesia maintained Oecussi’s special status and did not incorporate it into West Timor, as 
could be expected. During the negotiations of the borders, Portuguese even attempted to 
exchange the exclave for a territory that would be contiguous with East Timor, but Oecussi 
refused, claiming their lasting allegiance to the rest of the country. Despite the incorporation 
of the country into Indonesia, there was finally no boundary between the culturally similar 
Oecussi and West Timor inhabitants, which lead to increased family interlinking and trade 
activities. 
After East Timorese vote of independence on August 30th, 1999, the Indonesian army 
occupied most of the country and began a large scale violence and destruction. The East 
Timor was placed under the supervision of the United Nations, but by the time the peace 
enforcing troops reached the enclave, 95% of it was already destroyed (UN Development 
programme, 2001). The massive ethnic cleansing of East Timorese population resulted in 
approximately 250 000 people crossing borders and more than 1 400 killings were reported, 
as well as raping, looting and arson (Sakti, 2012). However, the justice processes with the 
alleged criminals did not take place until today and the inhabitants therefore have to bear the 
idea that crimes committed on their families remain unpunished by the international society 
(Ibid).  
What remains highly interesting is the fact that the East Timorese population, and especially 
its Oecussi part, do not invoke these severe human rights violations and attempt to avoid any 
confrontations with the Indonesians based on the historical events. Due to the forced 
displacement, many families became separated and despite various attempts to return the 
refugees to their home country, many of them remain settled in the bordering regions of 
West Timor (Sakti, 2012). They are no longer considered as refugees due to the UN decision 
to cease the usage of this status in 2002 (The UN Refugee Agency, 2002), which compelled 
them to quickly adapt to their lives to a new country.  
Returning back to the situation of the enclave, the restoration of East Timorese independence 
in 2002 with the help of the United Nations has once again resulted in Oecussi’s isolation, 
being surrounded by international borders and 80 kilometres distant from its mother country 
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(Hainsworth, 2000). Indonesia is currently rejecting any UN proposals to create a neutral 
land corridor through its territory, which would indubitably improve Oecussi’s economic 
standing and connection to East Timorese government structures (International Crisis Group, 
2010).  
As we have demonstrated, the circumstances of the enclave’s creation and the history behind 
East Timorese independence were very turbulent, leading from colonial past to demands and 
actual gaining of self-determination. Oecussi experienced changes in the border regime and 
destructive actions of Indonesia militia, and it still prefers to remain a regular part of East 
Timor, despite all of the inconveniencies this presents. The following part will try to examine 
the reasons for this uncommonly strong attachment, focusing on administrative, ethnical, 
economic and transit ties to East Timor.  
 
Relations with East Timorese central government  
Before focusing more closely on individual aspects of relations between Oecussi and its 
mother state, East Timor, the following part outlines the constitutional arrangement of 
enclave’s administration. This arrangement presents a background within which the 
questions of ethnicity, communication and trade will be examined and hopefully enables a 
better understanding of the complexity of this relationship.  
When drafting the constitution for the newly independent East Timor, the country had to 
acknowledge the special position of Oecussi. Due to the fact that choices about the 
government often reflect competing national and regional interests (Holthouse & Grenfell, 
2008), it was important that the suggested administration would limit the possibility of 
tension between the exclave and the mother state to minimum. The drafters thus considered 
two main choices.  
Firstly, the enclave would not be given any special status and would be administered the 
same as the other East Timorese contiguous districts. However, after consideration of other 
examples of enclaves around the world, this choice was dropped. It was argued that such an 
administration would not allow the enclave to make use of potential advantage that the 
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location provides and restricting its economic abilities would result in heavy demands from 
the national budget (UN Development Programme, 2001).  
The second choice proved to be more suitable. It suggested a special legislative regime that 
would allow the exclave to maximise its economic opportunities, which would consequently 
lead to minimal direct support from the government and limited demands from national 
budget (Ibid.) Also, Oecussi itself requested a special administrative regime, arguing with 
historical, religious, cultural, geographical and economic ties to West Timor. Therefore, in 
line with both governmental and exclave propositions, the constitution articles acknowledges 
the special regime of Oecussi, namely in Section 5 and Section 71. Both Sections agree that 
due to its territorially specific character the region deserves special administrative and 
economic treatment (Constitution of the Democratic..., 2002). This regime “would grant 
broad powers to a Special Region ..., including responsibility for public order, the right to 
receive donor aid directly and handle some international matters, control over administrative 
and economic subjects and a coordination role along with Dili for natural resources” (ICG, 
2010).  
Nevertheless, based on observations from Holthouse and Grenfall (2008), in practice the 
district has been governed in the same manner as the rest of the country. The main problem 
remains the unwillingness of the political representatives to move to the exclave and the poor 
transport conditions between East Timor and Oecussi (ICG, 2010). Due to the often absences 
of the ferry transport, the civil servants cannot reach the enclave and this is then left for 
longer time periods without effective administration. The reporters from the International 
Crisis Group (2010) concluded that there are still concerns about how to manage the 
devolution of power.  
In the meantime, the central government appoints a special minister for Oecussi, which 
resides in the exclave and leads a special council designed to coordinate the work of private 
sector representatives, business and industry associations and NGOs (Holthouse & Grenfell, 
2008). In addition, the commitment of the central government is visible by increased 
investments into the enclave, ensuring Oecussi of enduring East Timorese support (ICG, 
2010).  
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In conclusion, the administrative relations between Oecussi and East Timor are based on 
constitutional decision to grant the exclave sufficient administrative powers in order to be 
able to take full advantage of its specific character. However, due to insufficient transport 
possibilities the specific regime cannot be fully implemented and the enclave often remains 
without proper access to the government institutions. Nevertheless, the central government 
attempts to facilitate Oecussi’s situation by appointing special ministers and regular funding 
from the national budget. Obviously, the exclave does not consider the current regime as 
unsatisfactory, it does not require any constitutional change and therefore the situation and 
the relations between the enclave and the mother state remain considerably stable. As it has 
been stated by UN Development Programme (2001, 11), “is notable that there were no 
complaints about past events or deficiencies of the administration. The predominant attitude 
is a desire to move on and rebuild a better life for everybody.”  
The following part will examine more closely the ethnic, transit and trade factors of the 
enclave, attempting to find the reason explaining the strong bond between Oecussi and East 
Timor.  
 
Turbulent ethnic past 
From ethnical perspective, Oecussi inhabitants have strong ties to their West Timorese 
neighbours because of already mentioned historical reasons. The Topass community 
consisting of Black Portuguese was a separate kingdom that easily adapted the local habits 
from their neighbours. In addition, the contacts with the eastern part of the country were 
scarce and during the incorporation of the country into Indonesia after 1975, the borders 
between Oecussi and West Timor became even more porous and allowing intermingling of 
the inhabitants.  
Currently, the Oecussi population speaks the local Baiqueno language, which is used also in 
the region of West Timor. On the contrary, the predominant language of East Timor is 
Tetum, which is spoken merely by 39% of the Oecussi inhabitants (Asia Foundation, 2004). 
This understandably complicates the communication of the exclave with the mother land, 
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especially when the exclave to large extent shares also a cultural affinity with its neighbours.  
This connection to West Timor is founded on the family ties created through the marriage 
and remaining clan links (Holthouse & Grenfell, 2008). This has been strengthened even 
more by the flow of refugees following the Indonesian acts of violence in 1999, who refused 
or were not able to be repatriated, which resulted in dividing of families and needs for 
constant contact across the borders. It has been also suggested by observers (District Profile: 
Oecusse…), that this affinity between Oecussi and West Timor played a significant role in 
the reconciliation processes after the proclamation of independence of East Timor. Not only 
are the regions connected geographically and ethnically, but also the exclave realizes that its 
economic survival is highly dependent on the relations with Indonesia (Ibid.).  
What remains to large extent confusing, is the level of affection for East Timor and presented 
desire to remain a part of it despite various ethical and linguistic background. The mentioned 
problems in communication could in certain cases lead to demands of self-determination, as 
has been the example of what, but this obstacle obviously does not raise any concerns from 
the Oecussi side. The analysis of the Oecussi region conducted by the East Timorese 
government (District Profile: Oecussi…) also states that despite demands from the Oecussi 
side to be able to fully exercise their social and economic links with the region of West 
Timor, the Oecussi people still strongly identify with the nation of East Timor.  
 
Transport: Allowed but impossible  
As it had been presented in the research design, the question of transport plays a significant 
role in the relationship of mother state and the enclave in question. The example of Oecussi 
conveniently demonstrates this complexity.  
Following the successful separation of East Timor from Indonesia, one of the fundamental 
questions presented to both governments was that of delimiting states’ boundaries. While it 
has been clear that the border regime between the continuous East Timor territory and 
Indonesia will be ‘hard’, requiring travel visas and passports, the situation in the enclave was 
different. Based on the report of the United Nations Development Programme (2001) 
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focusing, the solution most favoured by the international community was an establishment of 
soft-border regime for three following reasons. Not only was a hard-border regime 
previously inexperienced in the area, but also it would limit regular family contacts and 
traditional ceremonies, that are highly valued in the Oecussi community (Sakti, 2012). In 
addition, hard borders would interfere with the organisation of livelihoods and significantly 
increase the cost of consumer goods (Oecussi: Integrated Development..., 2001).  
Bearing this in mind, it was concluded that applying hard-border policy “will result in 
stagnation of the district economy, deepening poverty and increasing demands for alleviation 
from the national budget” (Ibid., 17). The important link between the border regime and the 
possibilities for trade has been also highlighted in the Oxfam Australia Report by Holthouse 
and Grenfell (2008), emphasising the need to establish clearly set regulations that would 
facilitate the movement of people and goods.  
Similar intention of establishing soft-border regime was also presented by the Joint 
Ministerial Commission for Bilateral Cooperation (2002) signed by both Oecussi authorities 
and Indonesian government. It has been agreed that while the official implementations of the 
border regime are pending, the Oecussi inhabitants will be allowed to freely visit their family 
relatives and conduct small scale economic activities, requiring only an official letter of 
permission. Furthermore, it has been decided that the agreement between both sides reached 
by UNTAET will be reviewed, possibly facilitating the transport of Oecussi inhabitants 
through Indonesian territory and improving telecommunications system (Joint Ministerial 
Commission..., 2002).  
Nevertheless, this determined behaviour was soon overcome by a change in Indonesian 
attitude towards the enclave. While based on previous agreements only an official permit 
was necessary to cross the border with Indonesia, the new regulations from 2003 required 
from Oecussi inhabitants both a passport and a visa (Holthouse, 2008). This limitation to 
transport is strengthened by the fact that the overall cost of the administrative connected to 
obtaining a valid visa and a passport highly exceeds the regular income of Oecussi 
inhabitants and is definitely time-consuming (International Crisis Group, 2010). In addition, 
the border transit is possible only at two official border points, which are in general not 
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convenient for the local population. This consequently leads to increasing illegal border 
transit through uncontrolled areas.  
Despite initial attempts to allow freer transport of Oecussi inhabitants to East Timor, the 
today’s border regime can be described as hard. Also, there are currently no suggestions for 
creation of a neutral corridor or visa-free transit (ICG, 2010). However, as it has been 
remarked by International Crisis Group (2010), the road infrastructure on Indonesian 
territory is in such a bad condition that it would not enable Oecussi inhabitants to travel 
comfortably to East Timor, even with more liberal border controls.  
The only possible means of transport for the Oecussi inhabitants to visit East Timor is by 
means of ferry, which serves for the transport of both economic goods and people on weekly 
basis. However, even this way of transport is often unreliable due to unsustainable subsidies 
from international donors (Bano & Rees, 2005) and therefore the enclave remains largely 
separated from its mother state.  
As it has been demonstrated above, the ability of the enclave’s inhabitants to communicate 
freely with their mother state is highly limited. The initial willingness of Indonesia to 
facilitate access of Oecussi inhabitants to East Timor ended on 2003 and the newly 
established regulations prevent the majority of Oecussi population to cross the borders by 
legal means. Because of this, the illegal transit through the territory is a common 
phenomenon.  
 
Official trade and black market 
The question of trade is closely linked to the border regime established between East Timor 
and Indonesia. When considering the possibilities open to the enclave’s economic situation, 
the major obstacles for establishing a fully functioning trade are twofold.  
Firstly, the hard border regime prevents Oecussi inhabitants from engaging fully in 
international trade. As Holthouse and Grenfell (2008) state, the consequences of hardening 
the border regime resulted in worsening of Oecussi economic situation. While before East 
Timor independence the area was used as an important trading route, setting up the border 
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controls prevented Oecussi’s inhabitants from free exchange of goods with their West 
Timorese neighbours. In addition, the inconvenient location of border points and high taxes 
for imported produce resulted in spread of illegal movement of goods, mostly through 
unguarded walking tracks (District Profile: Oecussi...). As International Crisis Group report 
(2010) states, the Indonesian border controls are fully aware of the illegal trade, but they 
acknowledge that without certain extent of smuggling the enclave would not be able to 
survive.  
Aiming to change this unflattering situation, the Oecussi inhabitants suggested establishment 
of Special Economic Zone (UN Development Programme, 2001). Opening of the borders in 
this manner would enable the inhabitants a regular access to basic goods which are often 
scarce, and also improve a regular cross-border trade. This would consequently make the 
enclave economically self- sufficient (ICG, 2010) and potentially create “favourable set of 
conditions that the enclave could fully capitalise from its unique locality by becoming a trade 
gateway and by providing services such as bonded warehouses and distribution services to 
the Eastern archipelago region.” (UN Development Programme, 2001, 17). The room for 
improvement of Oecussi’s economic situation with Special Economic Zone was also 
acknowledged by Holthouse and Grenfell (2008), who see enclave’s major potential in 
becoming a free port and a trading hub between East and West Timor.  
The second major problem of Oecussi is the underdeveloped infrastructure and 
communication links to East Timor. The need for regular connections and transport, already 
highlighted in the previous section, would definitely increase Oecussi’s economic potential. 
The pressing need for improvement of these facilities is expressed also by the UN 
Development Programme (2001, 22) which states that “the degree of success ... in attracting 
investors to Oecusse would depend upon ... the availability of necessary infrastructure, such 
as roads, ports, airports, electricity, water supplies, and telecommunications - none of which 
are currently present to the necessary level.” If these services could be improved, the report 
predicts the future of Oecussi as a potential holiday destination and a self-sustainable centre 
for banking, financial activities or agro-industry (Ibid.).  
However, the creation of the Special Economic Zone is still not being realised and Oecussi is 
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to large extent limited by the hard-border regime and insufficient infrastructure. Enclave’s 
economic activities are almost non-existent and inhabitants get access to basic goods mostly 
by illegal routes. Nevertheless, this dire situation does not lead to any feelings of being 
discriminated by the mother state. This could be maybe explained by the fact that East Timor 
does not exploit the exclave, also because it does not possess any strategic resources, and the 
unfavourable circumstances of Oecussi were not created due to mismanagement from East 
Timorese side. Oecussi inhabitants probably realise that the possibility of improvement lies 
predominantly with the Indonesian side and their willingness to adjust the border regime 
with the enclave. In any case, the strong economic inconveniences caused by Oecussi’s 
exclaved character do not lead to any feelings of distrust towards its mother state.   
 
Concluding remarks  
The situation in the Oecussi exclave of East Timor has been observed in all its complexity. 
The historical background illustrated the difficult evolution of the country, leading from 
colonial past to full self-determination. During this process, the Oecussi enclave experienced 
various changes in the border regime. While being fully incorporated into Indonesia, the 
region was allowed considerably free communication with both East and West Timor. After 
East Timor’s proclamation of independence in 2002, the system radically changed and the 
Oecussi suddenly became completely enclaved by foreign territory, which conducted large 
scale violence against the enclave’s inhabitant and resulted in vast refugee flows. 
After the mediation from the United Nations, both East Timor and Indonesia agreed on 
establishment of soft-border regime in order to enable enclave’s economic activities and 
relatively uninhibited communication with its mother state. However, this decision changed 
when Indonesia imposed heavy administrative limitations on the border crossing in 2003 and 
thus prohibited both social contacts and any economic activity of Oecussi either with East or 
West Timor. In addition to failing economic situation, the lack of efficient transport to the 
mother state and non-permanent governmental structures in the exclave all seemingly 
predetermine Oecussi’s resentment towards its mother state. Nevertheless, the feelings of the 
exclave towards the mother state are completely opposite.  
  54 
From what has been previously described it is possible to conclude that the exclave’s strong 
attachment to East Timor originates in the historical development. During all the colonial 
times, the Portuguese colony was regarded as one compact item, which was not the same in 
the described case of Cabinda. Both the Dutch and Portuguese empires respected the unity of 
the colony and always enabled an access of the exclaves inhabitants to the mother state and 
vice-versa. Also after Indonesian take-over of East Timor, the enclave was not fully 
incorporated into West Timor and Indonesia remained to consider it as connected to East 
Timor. The continuous acknowledgement of the links between Oecussi and East Timor 
therefore fostered the enclave’s feeling of belonging to the mother state.  
It also appears that the strength of this connection cannot be diminished by obviously 
unfavourable circumstances, whether administrative, economic or transit. In all cases, the 
mother state attempted to find a solution that would enable more efficient functioning of the 
enclave, even when it constitutionally demanded certain level of devolution of power. When 
the mother state was not able to help the enclave, as was the case of economic agreements 
with Indonesia about the transport and taxation of goods, the enclave acknowledged East 
Timor efforts and did not consider it as a lack of interest from the mother state’s side. 
Therefore, it appears that the historical connection with its mother country and the desire to 
avoid any further complications are factors that are able to prevent enclave’s demands of 
independence, overcoming any administrative or economical difficulties that might be 
present.  
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Discussion  
The last part of this thesis will summarise our findings of the presented case studies and 
organise them in a way that would enable us to conduct the qualitative comparative analysis.  
As Ragin (1987) states, after acquiring throughout knowledge about both positive and 
negative cases, the next step is to find the most probable ‘recipe’ that would explain the 
difference in the outcome. As we have stated earlier, in order to facilitate the comparison, we 
have clustered the variables into two groups. Ineffective administration, economic 
inequalities and limited transit to the mother state all have their origins in the territorial 
arrangement of the exclave and are expected to deteriorate the relations between the exclave 
and the mother state. The historical connections with the former colonial empire and the 
exclave’s mother state, together with the existing ethnic links, are not linked to the 
territoriality and present rather the normative reasons for demands of independence. Before 
determining the influence of these clusters on the outcome, let us observe the findings from 
the positive case of Cabinda and the negative case of Oecussi. 
Being historically connected to the Portuguese overseas empire, the Cabinda region was not 
initially part of Angola’s territory. Their territorial connection was fully established only as 
late as 1956 and the incorporation of Cabinda into Angola without exclaves previous consent 
initiated the feeling of exclave’s resentment towards its new mother state. Exclave’s territory 
was then used as a base from which MPLA launched attacks on the Portuguese, in order to 
win its independence from their colonial rule. This resulted in permanent military presence in 
the exclave, which was viewed very negatively by its inhabitants, especially when the troops 
successfully eliminated exclave’s separatist attempts. Also, none of Cabinda’s parties was 
invited to the signing of the Alvor Agreement in 1975 and proclaiming Cabinda an 
inalienable part of Angola without exclave’s agreement further deteriorated its attitude 
towards the mother state.  
The ethnicity as the other normative variable that could potentially influence the demands for 
separatism is in the case of Cabinda not pronounced, as Cabinda shares the ethnicity of the 
inhabitants of northern Angola. However, Cabindans insist on their cultural affinity with the 
surrounding states of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo and even though this 
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disputable ethnical background serves as legal justification for self-determination, it does not 
initially trigger the separatist demands.  
The other significant determinant of exclave’s separatism, strengthening Cabinda’s 
resentment towards Angola, was the economic exploitation. The vast oil reserves, discovered 
by Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, became the major source of Angola’s GDP. The problem 
appeared when only limited amount of the income was dedicated to the development of 
exclave’s structures, whether administrative, educational or economic. This injustice fuelled 
the separatist movement, which resulted in reappearing clashes with the MPLA’s army and 
over 30,000 deaths. Continuing discrimination from Angola’s side appeared also after 
signing of peace accords in 2006, when the exclave and the mother state continued their 
conflict via political means.  
As Cabinda’s discontent with its administration is a result of the unfair economic distribution 
of wealth, this variable cannot be acknowledged as an initiating reason for independence 
claims and its strength is thus minimal.  
Summarising the above mentioned findings, we can state that while economic discrimination 
strengthened the feeling of resentment and gave Cabinda further incentives to continue its 
fight for independence, the initial trigger of Cabinda’s discontent were the historical 
conditions of transferring its sovereignty to other entity without its approval. The invoked 
reasons of lacking administration and different ethnic background serve more as a supporting 
cause, with which the exclave tries to legitimise its separatist attempts in the eyes of 
international community.  
Oecussi being a negative case in our analysis, it offers us more intriguing image. All of the 
observed aspects influenced by territorial character of the enclave, namely transit rights, 
administration and economic situation are in a dire state. The main reason of these 
unfavourable circumstances is the limitation on transport that is initiated by the Indonesian 
side. The cost and convenience of this new Indonesian regulation on the border transit highly 
exceeds the standards of the Oecussi inhabitants. Therefore, the trade and social connections 
with the neighbouring region of West Timor are scarce and mostly conducted by illegal 
means. The refusal of Indonesia to establish a neutral land route between Oecussi and East 
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Timor further deteriorates and minimises connections of the exclave to its mother state. The 
limitations of the transport also strongly influence the economic life of the exclave, as all 
imported and exported goods are subjected to high custom duties.  
Also in the administrative realm, the exclave experiences the impact of being divided from 
its mother state. Even though Oecussi is a special administrative region, the unwillingness of 
the civil servants to settle in the exclave prevents full implementation of this decision. 
Exclave’s access to the governmental institutions is highly dependent on the commuting of 
these civil servants to the exclave, which is frequently hindered by deficiencies in the ferry 
transport. Even though the initial problem with the administration lies in the unwillingness of 
East Timorese representatives to settle permanently in the exclave, it is obvious that the 
limitations of transport and the inaccessibility of Oecussi via land route further deteriorate 
the problem of exclave’s administration.  
The question of ethnicity and its influence on Oecussi’s decision on possible independence is 
also very intriguing. As it has been stated in the case study, the ethnic background of 
Oecussi’s inhabitants is different from those living in the contiguous East Timor. The 
exclave shares close links also with the region of West Timor, both from linguistic, cultural 
and family perspective. Nevertheless, it appears that this strict difference in ethnicity does 
not necessarily lead to separatist demands, as it does in the cases of e.g. Catalonia and 
Basque country.  
Even though Oecussi’s reasons of dissatisfaction would be understandable from the 
territorial perspective, the exclave maintains strong affinity to its mother state and does not 
regard any of its misfortunes as being intentionally caused by the mother state. The only 
viable explanation to this strong relationship is the historical background.  
As it has been acknowledged and described, both Oecussi and East Timor were colonized by 
Portugal, while the surrounding countries belonged to the Dutch empire. The constant threat 
of being attacked by another world power probably initiated this affinity between Oecussi 
and East Timor. This was further strengthened during many regime changes, as Indonesia 
always acknowledged this relationship and did not attempt to forcefully incorporate Oecussi 
into its territory. Therefore, the exclave and its mother state never had to face separation and 
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the connection between them remained strong.  
It therefore proves our assumption that the strength of this historical link is a strong 
determinant of the relationship between Oecussi and East Timor. The failing administration, 
dire economic situation and lacking communication with its mother state are obviously not 
strong enough to diminish the historical affinity between the two regions. The exclave thus 
remains a regular part of the East Timorese territory and does not initiate any separatist 
attempts.  
When comparing the two cases, several aspects come into the foreground. Both Oecussi and 
Cabinda were former Portuguese colonies. However, their relationship with their current 
mother state was created both in a different time period and in a different manner. While 
Cabinda was incorporated into Angola only after almost 100 years of independent existence, 
Oecussi was since its beginning acknowledged as a pertinent part of today’s East Timor.  
Therefore, the initial feelings of belonging to the mother state were diametrically different. It 
thus proves out assumption that it is exactly this feeling of historical belonging that 
predetermines further development in the enclave. The other territory-connected incentives 
work more as secondary mediating variables, influencing the strength of the connection 
between the mother state and the enclave, either in positive or negative way.  
As it can be observed, the economic and administrative variables have different effect and 
strength in both cases. The situation in Cabinda being already negative, the economic aspect 
managed to further intensify the resentment of exclave’s inhabitants towards the central 
government. However, similar economic limitations had next to no influence on the 
deterioration of Oecussi’s attachment to East Timor. It is true that the economic 
discrimination is much larger in Cabinda, where its own natural resources are exploited by 
other parties and the exclave does not receive any connected benefits. However, the 
economic conditions in Oecussi are also very demanding and as the main source of trade is 
by illegal means, the exclave could also demand greater interest from the part of the mother 
state.  
Furthermore, the administrative conditions are similarly unfavourable. Both exclaves have 
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gained the status of special administrative region with certain level of local autonomy. 
However, while this causes further frustration in Cabinda, it seems that the Oecussi enclave 
regards this inconvenience once again as an inevitable evil and does not blame East Timor 
for it.  
Similarly, the ethnic aspect is mentioned in completely different manner. In Cabinda, the 
slight ethnic difference in used as a reason for self-determination. In Oecussi, meanwhile, 
this difference is mentioned solely for the purposes of negotiating more convenient border 
regime, in order to maintain already existing family links and cultural ties. Otherwise, there 
is almost no impact of the ethnicity variable on the final outcome of the situation. 
After examination of the variables’ strength, the qualitative comparative analysis requires us 
to construct a simplified truth table, where “0” stands for positive attitudes, “1” for negative 
circumstances and “-” signifies minimal relevance for the case. 
Territory Norms  
Administration 
Economic 
situation 
Transit 
rights 
History Ethnicity 
Current 
situation 
Cabinda 1 1 - 1 - 1 
Oecussi 1 1 1 0 - 0 
 
Basing the final argument on mathematic logic of conjunction, we have hereby proved that 
the final outcome is determined by the coexistence of two variables’ clusters. The territory is 
not the only determinant of the separatist outcome and its impact always has to be observed 
in connection to the prevailing norms in society.  
The problem of qualitative comparative analysis lies in the fact that the value of the variable 
can be expressed only in terms of 0 and 1. This way, the truth table does not give us answers 
to the actual strength and influence of the variable. However, our case study demonstrates 
that despite strong territory-connected inconveniences, the prevailing determinant of 
independence is the historical relation between the mother state and the exclave.  
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Therefore, it can be concluded that the historical relations are the underlying cause of 
demands for independence that can be modified by other, territory-dependent variables. 
While initial negative relations between the mother state and the enclave is further 
strengthened by unfavourable conditions in economic administrative or ethnic sphere, 
relations that are built on a positive basis proved to be much harder to influence.  
 
Territoriality theory challenged 
With regard to our findings, what are the implications for existing territoriality theory?  
In the case of Oecussi it is evident that the implications of the territorial arrangement were 
overcome by administrating the two units as though they were one. Neither the exclave nor 
the mother state was formerly self-governing and therefore none of them experienced the 
humiliating situation of being deprived of its former independence, as was the case in 
Cabinda.  
However, Cabinda’s historical dissatisfaction with its administration by the colonial powers 
and later on by its mother state stemmed from territorial ground. By signing the treaty of 
Simulambuco in 1886, both Portugal and Cabinda acknowledged that the region is an 
independent, self-managing entity which is not subjected to any other state2. Only after the 
1956 decision of Portugal to join Angola and Cabinda together, Cabinda reacted negatively, 
attempting to protect its relative sovereignty. The idea of being incorporated into larger, 
more significant unit, met with Cabindans’ strong disapproval, resulting in the creation of the 
FLEC movement.  
Generally speaking, majority of the current difficulties that Oecussi experiences is caused by 
its inconvenient territorial situation. The main source of its problems is the restricted 
transport through Indonesia, which prevents the exclave to communicate freely with East 
Timor. Also, the economy, social connections and administrative matters are limited because 
                                                          
2
 This is meant figuratively, as it is obvious that by signing the treaty the exclave became a part of Portuguese 
colonial empire. 
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of this inconvenience. 
In Cabinda, however, not all of the variables which eventually led to separatist demands 
were caused by territorial aspects. It is true that the initial triggering moment of being 
incorporated into another state entity had a territorial character. However, the economic 
discrimination because of Cabinda’s vast natural resources definitely lacks a territorial 
dimension. Similar problems can be observed also in regions that are contiguous with the 
rest of the state, taking again the example of Catalonia and Basque country. Both of these 
regions experience the same feeling of discrimination, as their large economic productivity is 
not reflected in the consequent subsidies from the central government. Also, Cabinda’s 
insufficient funding and lacking administration were never presented in the context of being 
caused by the distance from the rest of the country, as was the case of Oecussi.  
The only two circumstances when the importance of territorial contiguity was visible, were 
the need to migrate in search of work and Angola’s use of the exclave as a foreign base from 
which it launched attacks on Portuguese colonisers. These two problems, however, do not 
have direct impact on Cabinda’s separatist demands and they function more as an additional 
reason which can be used to demonstrate exclave’s unfavourable position.  
To sum up, the situation in Oecussi is influenced by its territorial character to much greater 
extent than in Cabinda. The observed variables are largely dependent on the approval of the 
surrounding country to communicate with the mother state. Despite these problems, the 
affinity of the exclave to the mother state is strong enough to suppress the negative side of 
the territorial arrangement and thus it downplays its importance. On the contrary, the 
Cabinda case demonstrated strong territorial characteristic at the beginning of the conflict, 
when Cabinda was deprived of its self-rule and its territory became attached to another 
country. However, the other reasons leading to demands of independence were largely 
motivated by regular political aspects, with territorial division of Angola leading to only 
small number of problems.  
Therefore we conclude that the territorial concerns do not necessarily lead to demands for 
independence and while they can initiate potential disagreements, the importance of the 
territory is not strong enough to bring the exclave to full separation from its mother state.  
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Opposing the opportunity and willingness model 
After we have proved our initial assumption, we will also contrast our findings with the 
existing models on the causal logic in the international relations. The most representative is 
the model of opportunity and willingness, presented by Harvey Starr in 1976. Due to its 
behavioural character, this causal model was applied in academic researches focusing 
especially on the onset and diffusion of war, its contiguity, deterrence and interstate 
alliances.  
The causal logic within the opportunity and willingness model is an increased probability of 
occurrence of certain event, when states possess both the opportunity and willingness to act 
(Siverson & Star, 1990). As Cioffi-Revilla and Starr (1995, 448) state, “all political 
behaviour is fundamentally based on the probabilistic occurrence of two necessary 
conditions – related to the intent of actors and to their circumstances – neither one of which 
is pre-determined or guaranteed to occur.” The behavioural aspect is emphasized by the fact 
that despite possible operational opportunity to act, the main trigger of events is vested in the 
hand of international actors and their willingness to pursue certain action.  
The opportunity and willingness model is a clear example of a logical conjunction, arguing 
that as long as both aspects appear simultaneously, the desired outcome will inevitably 
appear. Nevertheless, our findings have demonstrated that the necessity of both opportunity 
and willingness does not apply to the cases of exclave’s separatism.  
The concept of willingness is represented by the intentions of the international actors, 
ranging from the political micro to macro level (Siverson & Starr, 1990). According to the 
authors, “willingness is related to a decision maker's calculations of advantage and 
disadvantage, cost and benefit, considered on both conscious and unconscious levels” (Ibid, 
85) and consequently transformed into concrete actions.  
Siverson and Starr (1990, 49) further define opportunity as “the possibilities that are 
available to any entity within any environment, representing the total set of environmental 
constraints and possibilities.” Such factors represent technological, intellectual or physical 
possibility of a state to act with at least a minimal probability of success.  
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After close examination of our cases, we state that this model fails to relevantly describe the 
circumstances of exclave’s separatist demands. While the desire of Cabinda to become 
independent, because of economic exploitation and failing administration, fits with the 
willingness aspect of Starr’s model, the opportunity aspect does not show any significance in 
this situation.  
As we have described previously, the current state of administration, infrastructure and social 
services in Cabinda is in lamentable conditions. While it is obvious that after its 
independence the exclave would be able to sustain itself economically, it is not so 
straightforward in the question of administration. Following ‘The Memorandum of 
Understanding for Peace in Cabinda’ from 2006, the exclave gained a special status, setting 
“the general bases for the organisation, powers and functioning of the State Administration 
in Cabinda, within the framework of its integration in the political and administrative 
division of the country and respect for the Constitution and other existing legislation” 
(Angola Press, 2008). However, this administrative change has happened only recently and 
therefore it cannot be concluded that at the beginning of the independence movement the 
opportunity for creating an independent state had been especially favourable. Also, the 
probability of the international community recognising Cabinda as an independent state have 
been limited (Koné, 1998) and the general facilities of the exclave, such as housing and 
infrastructure, which would definitely increase Cabinda’s chances for survival, are until 
today practically nonexistent.  
In these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine an effective existence of Cabinda as a state 
and nevertheless, the intensive desire to end the Angola’s discrimination overcomes all the 
practical necessities connected with the creation of a new state. Thus, the willingness alone is 
sufficient enough to trigger a political behaviour aiming for a desired outcome, even though 
it cannot be backed by any realistic capabilities of the exclave.  
As the model of opportunity and willingness has been applied previously mostly to the 
occurrence of war, the circumstances of territorial separatism may require a slight 
modification in the model’s causal mechanism. Based on the enclave’s strong feeling of 
discrimination by the mother state, certain enclaves can aim for independence despite 
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insufficient background for successful state building. In such cases, the enclave’s political 
leadership will further separatist demands even when essential administrative structures or 
economic resources will be absent. 
Nevertheless, it was not the intention of this thesis to completely revisit the opportunity and 
willingness model in the territorial terms. If this was to be reviewed, political scientists 
would have to apply it to a large spectrum of territorial situations. We limit ourselves to 
contrasting the findings of our research with the existing theory and suggest a further 
examination of this model in circumstances other than interstate conflict.  
The main contribution of this thesis lies in the finding that the territory does not have such a 
significant impact on the conduct of the international or intranational relations as the 
literature expects. When considering the separatist tendencies of enclaves, the final outcome 
is always determined by the interaction of both territorial and normative concerns, where the 
historical relations of countries serve as the underlying background that can be later modified 
by additional territorial influences. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis aimed to re-examine the importance of territory in context of separatism of 
enclaves. It has been our intention to prove that the demands of independence are influenced 
more by historical relations with the exclave’s mother state than by its territorial character 
and the inconveniences connected to it.  
In order to achieve this, we have firstly introduced the theoretical background. This 
explained why territory is considered to be important in the conduct of international relations 
from realist, normative and purely territorial perspective. The importance of territory was 
expected to be derived from its strategic, economic or ethnic content and the actions of 
international actors would try to preserve the territorial contiguity of the state’s territory.  
The main subject of our analysis were enclaves, discontinuous areas that are separated from 
their mother state by a territory of another state entity. The literature review revealed certain 
shortcomings in the existing enclaves’ research. The academic literature was largely 
inconsistent and lacked overarching theories that would explain the often mentioned puzzles, 
such as exclave’s continued existence in the age of consolidated nation states. Majority of the 
studies had a descriptive character and enclaves were used as independent variables only in 
the works of Vinokurov and Nies, determining the relations with other international actors. 
Therefore, we have decided to benefit from enclave’s specific territorial character and use 
them as the key subject of our research.  
In the terminological part we have defined the main terms that were used throughout the 
thesis and we made a distinction between enclaves, exclaves, semi-enclaves and other similar 
geographical phenomena.  
The selected research design was inspired by Charles Ragin and his qualitative comparative 
analysis. In order to make valid statements and conclusions based only on small N cases, we 
searched for certain number of variables that were expected to influence exclaves’ demands 
for independence. Following the QCA research design; we have selected cases with similar 
historical background; territorial constellation and inconvenient economic situation. Positive 
case being Cabinda and negative case being Oecussi, we justified creation of two clusters of 
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variables, one focusing on territoriality and the other on the prevailing norms and sentiments 
in the society.  
The case study revealed interesting findings that largely confirmed our initial hypothesis. 
After we have reviewed the influence of the individual variables on both cases, we confirmed 
that the historical relations of the exclaves to their mother state to large extent determine the 
final outcome in form of demands of independence.  
We have observed that the situation in Oecussi is to large extent defined by its territorial 
character of an enclave. All of the selected variables were dependent on the approval of the 
surrounding country to communicate with enclave’s mother state and even despite these 
problems, the affinity of the exclave to the mother state remained strong.  
On the contrary, reasons motivating Cabinda to demand its independence were influenced by 
territorial concerns only at the beginning of the conflict. However, all the other reasons were 
motivated mostly by political and economic aspects that had almost no connection to the 
enclave’s territorial character.  
Therefore we have concluded that while territory-connected variables demonstrated similar 
intensity in both cases, the separatist tendencies of Cabinda and the loyalty of Oecussi could 
be explained only by their previous relations with the mother states. Thus, the separatism is 
motivated by both territorial and historical factors, with the historical relations being the 
foundation of the independence demands and the territory merely strengthening the already 
negative attitude, as was the case of Cabinda. 
In the discussion part, we have put our findings into perspective with already developed 
causal logic models in international relations. The model of opportunity and willingness 
developed by Harvey Starr in 1987 presents simple behavioural causality, arguing that the 
occurrence of certain event is expected when the actors have both the opportunity and 
willingness to pursue this action. Based on the example of Cabinda we concluded that even 
though the exclave is almost incapable of creating and maintaining a functioning state, the 
strength of the willingness and determination is sufficient to pursue the path independence. It 
appears that as long as the region’s sovereignty is at stake, the initial necessity of coexisting 
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opportunity and willingness is decreased and the opportunity requirements are not essential 
for pursuing these political activities. 
In conclusion, our initial hypothesis that the separatism of enclaves is motivated not only by 
territorial reasons but by normative aspects as well has been confirmed and we have 
demonstrated that territory influences state behaviour only as a secondary variable that can 
further deteriorate already negative relations. However, if relations between the mother state 
and the enclave are positive, unfavourable circumstances resulting from territorial situation 
of the enclave do not have significant influence on the historical connection between the two 
entities.  
Therefore, it can be stated that even in circumstances where the impact of territory is 
increased, the sole territorial theory is not able to adequately describe the situation on the 
intrastate level and a further research focusing on the interaction of territory and norms is 
needed.  
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Appendix   
Table 1: Complete list of contemporary true enclaves 
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Adapted from Vinokurov (2006) 
Footnotes:  
*         Unconfirmed at time of writing 
**        Enclaves by way of being entirely surrounded by the territorial waters of another country 
E        Enclaves 
CE      Counter-Enclaves 
CCE    Counter-Counter-Enclaves 
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